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CHAPTER 1:  
                      INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), the Doha Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health (the Doha Declaration) and the subsequent Decision on 
the Implementation of Paragraph 6 (the Decision) all provide the framework for 
the interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities.1 The Doha Declaration reaffirmed and 
upheld the right of member states to adopt a flexible interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement’s provisions; further the Decision put into place a temporary waiver of 
Article 31(f) which was adopted to ensure the protection of public health. The 
Declaration reflected a growing concern among the developing Members about the 
effects of the TRIPS Agreement on issues of health and clarified as well that public 
health crises can constitute a “national emergency” or “other circumstances of 
extreme urgency”.2 In Paragraph 4 the Declaration mandates that the TRIPS 
Agreement must be interpreted in light of public health perspectives. 
 
The purpose of the study is to assess the achievements and benefits in the area of 
access to essential medicines,3 if any, brought about by the Doha Declaration for 
                                                 
1  Osewe et al, “Improving access to HIV/AIDS  medicines in Africa: Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights Flexibilities” ( 2008) ix. 
2 Correa, “Implications of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health” (2002) 
WHO Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy 1. 
3 Essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health care needs of the population. They are 
selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on efficacy and comparative cost 
effectiveness. Essential medicines are intended to be available within the context of functioning 
health systems at all times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured 
quality and adequate information, and at a price the individual and community can afford. The 
implementation of the concept of essential medicines is intended to be flexible and adaptable to 
many different situations; exactly which medicines are regarded as essential remains a national 
responsibility. The essential drugs concept has been the basis of the WHO’s drug strategy since 
1975. 
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developing countries as they initiated its discussion and were enormously 
instrumental in its adoption.4 
In order to achieve its aim the thesis shall;  
 
? Give a brief background and discussion on the adoption of the multilateral 
TRIPS Agreement and a brief discussion on the flexibilities as envisioned in 
the Agreement. 
?  Assess the utilization of these flexibilities before the Doha Declaration. 
?   Critically discuss the adoption of the Declaration and the Decision and 
their legal status, with focus on their implications for access to medicines in 
developing countries.   
? Evaluate the usage of the flexibilities, as well as the article 31(f) waiver 
mechanism in the post-Doha era and the challenges faced by developing 
countries particularly with reference to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. 
? Draw conclusions as to whether the Doha Declaration has achieved any 
meaningful results in the face of the critical need of essential medicines in 
developing countries and also proffer recommendations. 
 
 
1.2 Background 
In issues of access to essential medicines the problem confronted by developing 
countries is two-fold.5 Firstly research and development is chiefly driven by market 
forces and not medical need, secondly the high prices of patented brand name 
drugs create a barrier to access in developing countries.6 These two issues have 
driven the public health and TRIPS debate. 
                                                 
4 Musungu, “The use of flexibilities in TRIPS by developing countries: Can they promote access to 
medicines?” (2006) South Centre Perspectives 9. Available online at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=45&dir=DESC
&order=date&Itemid=68&limit=10&limitstart=120  (accessed on 04/10/08) 
5 Martin, “Balancing intellectual monopoly privileges and the need for essential medicines.” (2007) 
2 Globalization and Health. Available online at 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/4  accessed on 12.03/09. 
6 Martin (fn 5) 2. 
Research and development primarily focuses on problems inherent in industrialized countries such 
as baldness, impotence and obesity at the expense of diseases that affect the poor such as TB and 
malaria.  
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In the contemporary global trading system developing countries continue to face 
complex challenges to implementing some of the international agreements that 
were negotiated during the Uruguay Round.7  
 
Under the TRIPS Agreement, current and future members of the WTO must adopt 
and enforce, through domestic legislation, nondiscriminatory minimum standards 
prescribed for the protection of intellectual property rights  (IP rights).8 It would 
appear that, although TRIPS adopts the so-called “minimum standards” stance, it 
has in fact achieved the exact opposite in that international standards of protecting 
IP rights have been greatly elevated, and that the international standards of 
protection are far stricter than those prevailing in developing countries at the time 
of its adoption.9. As such, the patenting of medicines has become more prevalent 
after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement. Effectively this means that any IP 
agreement negotiated subsequently can only create higher standards than those 
provided by the TRIPS Agreement commonly referred to as “TRIPS plus.” 
 
The TRIPS Agreement contains some safeguard provisions also known as 
flexibilities which permit compulsory licensing, parallel imports, early working 
exception,  transition periods, mail box provisions which developing countries and  
least developed countries (LDCs) can explore to ensure access to medicines for 
their citizens. However, implementation of these provisions in practice has not 
been as easy as expected. Attempts at using the TRIPS flexibilities, particularly 
compulsory licensing, have often been resisted by developed countries and their 
research-based pharmaceutical enterprise constituency Pharma.10  
 
                                                 
7 Osewe (fn 1) 1. 
8 Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that: “Members shall give effect to the provisions of this 
Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their laws more extensive 
protection than is required by this Agreement.” 
9Oh, “Compulsory Licenses: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries” (2006) 1 International 
Journal, Intellectual Property Management, 22. 
10 Such countries include South Africa, Brazil and Thailand. These will be fully dealt with in the next 
chapters. Pharma is commonly used when referring to the major research-based pharmaceutical 
enterprises on a global scale. 
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The debate on the effect of the TRIPS Agreement and access to medicines came to 
the fore prominently in 1997 after a group of pharmaceutical companies filed a 
lawsuit against the South African Government challenging the amendment of its 
Medicines Act. The lawsuit was met with international outcry from civil 
organizations and other members of the WTO in particular the developing 
countries.11 Ultimately the group of pharmaceutical companies withdrew its case in 
the face of international pressure. However the point had been made- that 
international trade rules, particularly the TRIPS Agreement, could be used to 
challenge legitimate efforts by governments in making medicines more accessible 
to their citizens. The pharmaceutical industry argued that the South African 
government was implementing parallel importation and compulsory licensing in 
an arbitrary manner inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement. Therefore there was a 
pressing need to clarify the policy space provided in the TRIPS Agreement. This set 
the scene and provided the momentum for the ongoing TRIPS and public health 
debate. 
 
The question of whether pharmaceutical patents impede access to essential 
medicine in lower income countries has been the subject of debate engaging the 
United Nations (UN) as well as the WTO together with activists and 
pharmaceutical companies.12  
 
The patent provisions in the TRIPS Agreement have always been the subject of 
significant controversy among the WTO’s membership.13 A fundamental aspect of 
the Agreement is that Members have flexibility regarding the manner in which they 
can implement their obligations; a characteristic which developing countries felt 
should be preserved, for example, in granting compulsory licences as well as 
making use of the parallel importation mechanism, among the other flexibilities.14 
                                                 
11 Abbott, “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a dark 
corner at the WTO” (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law, 471. 
12 Attaran, “How do patents and economic policies affect access to essential medicines in developing 
countries?”, (2004) 23 Health Affairs 155. 
13Abbott and Correa, “WTO Agreements: Intellectual property issues” (May 2007), Quaker United 
Nations Office, Global Economic Issues Publication, 1 .   
14 Abbott and Correa (fn 16) 1. 
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This culminated with the adoption of the Doha Declaration in 2001 at the WTO’s 
Fourth Ministerial Conference at the instigation of the Africa group supported by a 
number of other developing countries.15 Paragraph 4 of the Declaration confirmed 
that the TRIPS provisions contained sufficient flexibility so that the obligations to 
protect IP rights under TRIPS would not prevent members from taking measures 
to protect public health, and confirmed the legitimacy of the broad use of the 
TRIPS flexibilities available to promote access to medicines.16  
 
The fundamental tenet of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement is that 
‘the Agreement can and should be interpreted in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all’. This resonates with the provisions of article 8 of the TRIPS 
Agreement which provides that members may adopt measures necessary to protect 
public health. The Doha Declaration clarified the flexibilities, while compulsory 
licensing and parallel importation were specifically mentioned and guaranteed 
governments that they were well within their rights (or indeed their obligations to 
their citizens!) when implementing these flexibilities.17 The Doha Declaration 
acknowledged the liberty that governments had in determining grounds upon 
which compulsory licenses could be granted, as well as establishing what amounts 
to circumstances of national and extreme emergency. The Declaration also 
encouraged member states to interpret the TRIPS Agreement in a manner 
promoting public health access to medicines for all.18 
 
                                                 
15 Kongolo, “WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration and Intellectual Property: African Perspectives.” 
(2002) African Yearbook of International Law,201. 
16 Paragraph 4 provides that, “the TRIPS Agreement does not and should prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health  and that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO’s members’ right to protect public health, and in 
particular , to promote access to medicines for all”. 
17  Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration. 
18 The last part of paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration provides that “we affirm that Agreement can 
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to 
protect public health, and in particular promote access to medicines for all”.  
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In Paragraph 6 of the Declaration members recognized the problems posed by 
article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement that would be faced a country with no or 
insufficient drug manufacturing capacity. Article 31 (f) dealing with ‘other use 
without authorization of the right holder’19 stipulates that manufacture of a 
patented product under article 31 shall be ‘predominantly for the domestic market 
of the member authorizing such use’ with the result that members without 
sufficient manufacturing capacity could not make use of this flexibility without 
flouting this provision of the TRIPS Agreement. Members then tasked the General 
Council to expediently find a solution which was arrived at more than two years 
later in the form of the 30 August Decision implementing paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration. The Decision in essence decreed an interim waiver of the Article 31(f) 
limitation, allowing medicines produced under compulsory license to be exported 
to countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity under specified 
procedural terms and conditions. 
 
In 2005 the WTO adopted a Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement making 
permanent the 30 August Decision permanent by inserting its provisions as article 
31 bis. A two thirds majority is required before the amendment can be incorporated 
into the TRIPS Agreement and to date the number of Members who have accepted 
the amendment has not reached the required two thirds.20 The deadline which had 
been set as 2007 for acceptance was not met and it was extended to 31 December 
2009. Effectively the waiver on art 31(f) still remains a temporary solution.  
 
The Declaration not only provided a legal interpretation clarifying the position of 
the TRIPS Agreement, but also served as a landmark political commitment re-
affirming the option of WTO Member states to use all flexibilities provided in the 
                                                 
19 A note on article 31 provides that “other use” refers to use other than that allowed under article 30 
which deals to exceptions to rights conferred 
20 Available online at www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm. (accessed on 
07/02/09).  
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TRIPS Agreement to ensure access to affordable medicines and to prevent patent 
monopolies where medicines are needed for public health.21  
 
Moreover five years after its adoption, the Decision has only been used once; only 
one drug has been manufactured and delivered to a least-developed country (LDC) 
under this Decision with diverse arguments being made regarding the non-usage of 
the mechanism which shall be discussed in the subsequent chapters. The importing 
country Rwanda notified the TRIPS Council of its intention to use the Paragraph 6 
system as an importer in July 2007 while the exporting country Canada also 
notified its intention to use the system as exporter in October 2007.22  In 
September 2008, the first shipment of an anti-retroviral combination drug for 
HIV/AIDS under the Paragraph 6 system was due in Rwanda after a four-year 
process.23 
 
It has been shown that patents protection had the effect of increasing the price of 
drugs.24This is because a patent allows the holder to exercise a monopoly excluding 
other manufactures which gives them the liberty to set prices.25  
    
These unaffordable prices then act as a barrier to treatment, for example access to 
antiretroviral drugs in income-constrained countries continues to exist, while 
challenges are complicated by the enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement.26 
                                                 
21“Claiming our space: Using the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement to protect Access to 
medicines.” (2006) Equinet Policy Series No. 16  (Perspectives from the Southern and Eastern 
Africa Trade  and Negotiations Institute).   
22 Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_export_e.htm 
(accessed on line 19/10/08). 
23 “Global access to medicines not improved by TRIPS waiver, some say.”  
The Canadian company Apotex issued a compulsory license in September 2007 (the first in the 
world under the WTO Decision) and a willing developing country Rwanda was found. Available 
online at http://www.ip_watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1250. (accessed on 08/10/08). 
24  Correa, “Intellectual property rights, the WTO and developing countries: the TRIPS Agreement 
and policy options.” (2000) 35. 
An analysis done on Malaysia in 1990, where patent protection existed, showed that drug prices 
were between 20 per cent and 760 per cent higher than in India where patent protection did not 
exist.  
25 Osewe et al (fn 1) 2. 
26 Dionisio et al, “Perspectives: For-profit policies and equitable access to antiretroviral drugs in 
resource limited countries” (2008) Future HIV Therapy 2 (1) 25. 
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TRIPS has also courted criticism for imposing a “one size fits all” approach for IP 
rights protection on countries at widely differing levels of development, despite 
varying interests and policies.27 Numerous factors such as historical, economical as 
well as social indicate that a unified approach towards IP rules not only lacks in 
benefits but may be detrimental as well.28 The history of patent policy itself has 
shown that even developed countries have at one point in time adopted weaker 
patent systems so as to promote the growth of technology-dependant sectors.29  
 
 1.3 Problem Statement 
Solely investing into research and development does not ensure that people living 
in poor countries will receive new treatments. For there to be access to the 
products of innovation, the fruits thereof must be affordable. Sadly though people 
infected with HIV/ AIDS, for example, in developing countries continue to grapple 
with the exorbitant prices of antiretroviral (ARV) drugs close to a decade after the 
adoption of the Declaration. A recent study in South Africa revealed that 93 percent 
of people living with HIV/AIDS were still alive after a year of treatment, 
highlighting the need for urgent action in making treatment accessible.30  
 
This brings to the fore the issue of balancing the interests of inventors against the 
interests of the end users of their inventions.  The Declaration in Paragraph 4 
clearly states that issues of public health are to take precedence over the rights of 
pharmaceutical patent holders. The question which begs an answer then is whether 
this has actually been translated into a reality for those people in need of life saving 
medicines in the developing world.  Simply put, has the Doha Declaration achieved 
its mandate in making essential medicines more accessible in developing 
                                                 
27 George, “Does one size fit all? A comparative study to determine an alternative international 
patent harmonization” (2009) Cornwell Law School Graduate Student Papers 10. Available online 
at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&context=cornell/lps  (accessed on 
14/04/09). 
28 George (fn 27) 10. 
29 George (fn 31) 11. 
30 “Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretroviral Therapy- A report on “3 by 5” and beyond” 
World Health Organization (March 2006) 26. Available online at 
http://www.who.int/hiv/fullreport_en_highres.pdf (accessed 11/10/08). 
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countries? It is the aim of this study to answer this question and to evaluate the 
success or failure of the Doha Declaration.  
 
Infectious diseases are responsible for almost half of all deaths in developing 
countries.31 The study will pay particular attention to access to medicines relating 
to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which is currently annihilating populations worldwide 
particularly in Sub- Saharan Africa.32 More than three quarters of all AIDS deaths 
globally in 2007 occurred in Sub- Saharan Africa. The region has slightly more 
than 10% of the world’s population but it bears the brunt of the HIV/ AIDS 
pandemic as it is home to more than 66 per cent of the global HIV/ AIDS 
population.33 
 
Moreover statistics have shown that a third of the world’s population still lacks 
access to essential medicines, a figure which is set to increase to more than 50 per 
cent concentrated in Africa and Asia.34 
 
1.4 Scope of research 
This study focuses on both the developing countries as well as LDCs in the WTO. 
The experiences of these countries in implementing the flexibilities both before the 
Doha Declaration as well as in its aftermath are given special attention.   
 
1.5 Significance of research 
The importance of the adoption of the Doha Declaration and the Decision can 
never be over-emphasized, in particular the Declaration indicated that there is 
                                                 
31 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues.global/medicine/index_en.htm (accessed on 
09/10/08). 
32 According to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Update of December 
2007 an approximate number of 33 million people were living with HIV/ AIDS by the end of 2007 
with 22.2 million of these people being located in Sub- Saharan Africa and approximately 1.9 
million people were newly infected with HIV during that year 
Available online at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/knowledgeCentre/HIVData/Epi_Update/EpiUpArchive/2007/default.a
sp  (accessed on 10/10/08). 
33 Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Update (fn 35). 
34 Kerry, “TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph 6 decision: What are the remaining steps for 
protecting access to medicines?” (2007) 3 Globalization and Health 2. 
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strength in numbers when the Africa Group presented a united, front and managed 
to have their voice heard within the multilateral trading arena. Whether the 
Declaration has brought about the desired result in reality is a different matter 
altogether, which is what this study seeks to evaluate. The value of this study is, 
therefore in conducting a ‘stock take’, an assessment of the gains of the Doha 
Declaration and the Decision. The aim is to assess whether access to essential 
medicine has in fact improved in the aftermath of the Doha Declaration and the 30 
August Decision. The assessment will bring to light the successes and failures of 
the Doha Declaration and provide a way forward for all stakeholders in the ongoing 
efforts of making medicines more accessible in developing countries. 
 
1.6 Research methodology 
The research draws on existing literature on the subject matter and other available 
evidence. Literature relating to the international debate on TRIPS is used 
extensively. Information from international and non-governmental organizations 
engaged in ensuring improved access to medicines is also utilized. 
 
1.7 Preview of the chapters 
This study comprises of five chapters dealing with the following subjects  
 
CHAPTER 1 -Introduction and Background 
This introductory chapter provides an over- view of the mini thesis. It lays out the 
objectives of the study, background, the research question, the scope of the study 
as well as its significance. The main views on the on-going TRIPS versus public 
health debate are briefly alluded to. 
 
Chapter 2 –The Pre-Doha Era 
The chapter begins with a discussion on the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement into 
the multilateral trading arena. The flexibilities are discussed as well as their 
utilization by developing countries and LDCs, before the adoption of the Doha 
Declaration. The manner in which these flexibilities were implemented is analyzed. 
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The reasons for utilizing these mechanisms will also be discussed as well as the 
responses these usages elicited from other WTO members.   
 
Chapter 3- The Doha Declaration and the 30 August Decision 
The essence of this chapter is to address the Declaration and the Decision. To this 
end the chapter discusses the provisions of the Declaration as well as the 30 August 
Decision. The implications of and legal status of these two instruments is also be 
addressed.   
 
Chapter 4– Post Doha era 
The major driving force behind the Africa Group’s initiation for the adoption of the 
Declaration was to seek affirmation of the legitimacy of the flexibilities contained 
in the TRIPS Agreement and thereby improve access to medicines. 
 
This chapter focuses on developing countries’ usage of the flexibilities as affirmed 
by the Declaration. Attention is also given to the only instance of the usage of the 
article 31(f) waiver (at the time of writing). The challenges met by these countries 
are dealt with in an effort to find solutions. This chapter seeks to answer the 
question of whether the Doha Declaration has indeed increased access to essential 
medicines. 
 
The Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement which seeks to make permanent the 
waiver of article 31(f) is also discussed.  
In this chapter the thesis attempts to answer whether or not Doha has delivered on 
its mandate regarding access to essential medicines for all. 
  
Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Recommendations  
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CHAPTER 2: 
TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN THE PRE DOHA ERA 
This chapter discusses the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in the multilateral 
trading arena, the rationale of patent protection, the “minimum standards” 
brought by the Agreement and the implications of these standards in the area of 
access to essential medicines. The connection between the Agreement and public 
health, the flexibilities and how developing countries can make use of them in 
efforts to improve access to essential medicines are discussed. Examples of case 
studies on the implementation of the flexibilities are cited and the reactions of the 
pharmaceutical industry as well as actions by other Members of the WTO to the use 
of the flexibilities are noted. This is for purposes of contrasting whether after the 
Doha Declaration the same attitudes still prevail.  
 
2.1 The emergence of TRIPS in the global trading arena 
Industrialized countries perceived weaknesses in the IP framework prior to 
TRIPS.35 The desire to eliminate this perceived weakness essentially formed the 
agenda for the Uruguay Round initiated at the Ministerial Conference which 
launched the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations at Punta Del Este 
(Uruguay) in September 1986.36 As per the industrialized countries the pre-TRIPS 
system did not bring uniformity among national regimes.   
 
The two primary perceived defects were: firstly, the absence of detailed rules on the 
enforcement of rights before national judicial administrative authorities; and 
secondly the absence of a binding and effective mechanism for the settlement of 
disputes between states. 37 Developed countries also argued that the arrangement 
which was in place did not sufficiently safeguard their technology-based economies 
                                                 
35 Pre- TRIPS rules included a few rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
namely articles IX and XX (d) which dealt specifically with IPRs. There were also a number of 
international conventions, a majority of which were and still are administered by WIPO. The two 
principal international intellectual property covenants being the Paris Convention for the Protection 
of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.  
36 Gervais, “The TRIPS Agreement-Drafting history and analysis” 3 ed (2008) 11. 
37 Gervais, (fn 36) 10. 
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as the evolution of the world trading system, increased importance of IP, and 
required a paradigm shift regarding international IP rules.38 
 
Based on these perceived shortcomings the goals of the TRIPS Agreement was to 
preclude Member governments from sanctioning unrestrained “free-riding” on 
foreign creations and innovations, as well as to secure for inventors and creators a 
return on their investments from the sale or licensing of innovative goods.39 These 
two goals have been achieved by significantly increasing the returns to technology-
exporting countries in the period since the Agreement’s adoption much to the 
detriment of the less affluent in society.40 
 
2.1.1 Resistance by developing countries 
Right from the beginning developing country members did not share the same 
enthusiasm as the industrialized countries regarding the incorporation of IP 
matters into the multilateral trading system.41  At formal meetings developing 
countries consistently expressed serious concerns about possible over-protection of 
IP rights, which could in their view, obstruct transfer of technology and increase 
the cost of, among other things, agricultural and pharmaceutical products.42 In 
retrospect one can see the wisdom and for sight which developing countries had at 
the time which was unfortunately overlooked. As the Round unfolded many 
developing countries were still opposed to an all-encompassing agreement. 
 
 Exercising unilateral pressure, by means of their significant negotiating power 
within the GATT setting,43 industrialized countries coerced developing countries 
into negotiating the TRIPS Agreement with the aim of universalizing standards of 
                                                 
38 Abbott, “Protecting first world assets in the third world: Intellectual property negotiations in the 
GATT multilateral framework” (1989) 22 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 696. 
39 Abbott and Reichman, “The Doha Round’s public health legacy: strategy for the production and 
diffusion of patented medicines under the amended TRIPS provisions” (2007) 10 Journal of 
International Economic Law 924. 
40 Abbot and Reichman (fn 39) 924. 
41 Correa (fn 24) 3. 
42 Gervais (fn36) 14. 
43Before the establishment of the WTO in 1994 the GATT 1947 (General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs) not only referred to the agreement itself, it also referred to the provisional institution 
regulating international trade.  
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protection for IP rights which the industrialized countries had integrated into their 
national legislation after they had attained an elevated level of technological 
development, which the developing countries had not acquired.44 
 
As such developing countries unwillingly negotiated the enhanced protection for 
intellectual property rights and ultimately consented to making crucial 
compromises with regards to making reforms to the domestic patent laws without 
achieving any significant concessions from industrialized countries.45  
 
2.1.2 The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement which has been described as being the “most comprehensive 
multi-lateral agreement on intellectual property” was adopted at Marrakesh on 15 
April 1994 as Annex 1C of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.46 Unlike any of the preceding treaties 
dealing with intellectual property, TRIPS has wider coverage in terms of improving 
on the existing treaties dealing with intellectual property. Most critically the 
agreement introduced the issues of enforcement and dispute resolution.47  
 
The reasons for the controversy over the TRIPS Agreement reflect, inter alia, the 
perception by a number of Members that the existing focus of IP rights on new 
technologies considerably undermines the current stocks of knowledge, 
information as well as the products thereof.48 
 
 
2.2 The rationale of pharmaceutical patents 
The principal economic rationale for granting patents is founded on the 
assumption that it will motivate research and innovation i.e. research and 
                                                 
44 Correa (fn 24) 3. 
45 Gervais  (fn 36) 14. 
46 An over-view of the TRIPS Agreement available on line at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm accessed on 10/02/09 
47 Part III the Agreement deal with the enforcement of intellectual property rights, while Part V 
deals with dispute prevention and settlement.  
48 Abbott, “TRIPS in Seattle: The not so surprising failure and the future of the TRIPS agenda” 
(2000) 18 Berkeley Journal of International Law 165.  
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development (R &D).49 When developing countries grant patent protection the 
costs thereof far outweigh the benefits which are supposed to flow from patent 
protection, as these benefits occur in developed countries and not developing 
countries.50 
 
Although both developed and developing countries agree that patents can offer an 
incentive for inventors for the development of new medicines, this has not 
prevented developing countries from questioning the rationale that the 
pharmaceutical industry has not up until now relied on developing countries’ 
patent rents for their research budgets.51  
 
Those advancing the aims of the pharmaceutical industry argue that patents for 
essential medicines are quite rare in poor countries and therefore patents cannot 
be the reason why there is lack of access to those medicines, it is poverty rather 
than patents which greatly limits access to essential medicines.52A survey carried 
out in 2001 on anti-retrovirals (ARVs) in Africa revealed that the majority of these 
drugs were not under patent protection in many African countries53  
 
However the mere fact that drugs are not patented in all markets certainly does not 
mean that patents do not impede access. A company needs to only strategically 
obtain a patent in a country with manufacturing capacity and thereby oust all 
                                                 
49 Chaudhuri, “Is product patent protection necessary in developing countries for innovation? R&D  
by Indian pharmaceutical companies after TRIPS” (2007) Indian Institute of Management, 
Calcutta, Working Paper Series No. 614, 1. Available online at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/trips.htm (accessed on 11/04.09). 
50 Chaudhuri, (fn 49) 2.  
51 Abbott, “The WTO medicines Decision: World pharmaceutical trade and the protection of public 
health” (2005) 99 The American Journal of International Law 324. 
 ‘Rents” are the returns to the inventors and creators in technology exporting countries 
52 Attaran, “How do patents and economic policies affect access to essential medicines in developing 
countries?”(2004) 23 Health Affairs 156. 
The industry has argued that the effect of patents is negligible because 95 percent of the WHO’s 
essential drugs have never been patented in the countries most affected by these diseases.   
53 Hestermeyer, “Human rights and the WTO: The case of patents and access to medicines” (2007) 
150. 
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competition and the majority of developing countries do not possess these 
capabilities therefore there is no impetus to obtain patents in such countries.54    
 
The pharmaceutical industry has also cited poor infrastructure and the inadequacy 
of medical personnel as the principal impediments to accessing health care.55 The 
significance of improved infrastructure, personnel recruitment and training has 
never been disputed however these must not diminish the fundamental element of 
pharmaceutical costs, with the price of medicines directly affecting the ability of 
patients to obtain them more so in the case of life-saving medicines.56  
 
2.3 Minimum standards in the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement is considered to be the only multilateral agreement to set 
minimum standards for the protection of IP rights.57 The Agreement establishes 
minimum standards in the arena of IP with the consequence that all Members have 
to comply with these standards by amending their domestic laws in order to reflect 
the Agreement’s minimum standards.58  
 
2.3.1 The implications of minimum standards 
Article 1 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing with the nature and scope of obligations 
under the Agreement states that Members shall give effect to the Agreement’s 
provisions and that Members may but shall not be obliged to implement more 
extensive protection than is required by the Agreement. The indication that 
members may go beyond TRIPS thus establishes that the provisions of the 
agreement are minimum standards. International conventions prior to the TRIPS 
Agreement did not require minimum standards for patents and at the time the 
Agreement was negotiated over forty countries in the world did not confer patent 
                                                 
54 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 150. 
55 Abbott, “WTO TRIPS Agreement and its implications for access to medicines in developing 
countries” (2002) Study Paper 2a, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Study Paper 8. 
56 Abbott (fn 55) 8. 
57 Weitsman, “TRIPS, access to medicines and the North-South Conflicts after Doha: The end or the 
beginning?” (2006) Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law 1. 
58 Elbeshbishi, “TRIPS and Public Health-What should African countries do?” (2007) African Trade 
Policy Centre Work in Progress N0. 49, Economic Commission for Africa .3 
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protection for pharmaceutical products.59 Moreover patent protection, in those 
countries where it was granted, patent duration was considerably shorter in the 
majority of those countries.60 For example, developed countries granted for patent 
duration ranging from fifteen to seventeen years, whilst in a number of countries 
patents were granted for as short as five to seven years.61 
Under the former Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property a 
country was merely obliged to extend the same treatment both to its nationalities 
as well as foreigners.62 The TRIPS Agreement, in requiring minimum levels of 
protection, has limited the capacity of governments to monitor and protect public 
health, and ensure access to affordable generic medicines.63 
The TRIPS Agreement also extended the scope of patents from the traditional 
process patents to also cover product patents, before the Agreement many 
developing countries did not patent pharmaceutical products and not processes.64 
Before the TRIPS Agreement was adopted most developing countries did not 
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products, only processes. The coming 
into force of the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 has seen an increase in the levels of 
intellectual property protection worldwide as WTO Member countries had to 
change their laws in order to be TRIPS compliant.65 Although the agreement 
adopts a “minimum standards” stance the reality is different for most developing 
                                                 
59 Access to Medicines, WHO Drug Information, (2005) 19 238. 
60Elbeshbishi (fn 58) 238. 
61 Elbeshbish (fn 58) 238. 
62 Of March 20, 1883, as revised on 14 July 1967 in Stockholm.    
It provides in article 2 for national treatment of foreign industrial property by stipulating essentially 
that foreign industrial property shall be afforded the same protection as national products for 
countries within the Union (the Union being countries to which the Convention applies).   
63Shaffer et al, Ethics in public health research – Global trade and public health,(2005)  95 
American Journal of Public Health 32. 
64 Gupta, “Patent rights on pharmaceutical products and affordable drugs: Can TRIPS provide a 
solution?” (2005)  Buffalo Intellectual Property Law Journal 1. 
 A product patent differs from a process patent. The latter means that only the process through 
which a product is made can be patented, the final product itself is not covered under this right. A 
patentee for a patented process can only prevent third parties from using the process but cannot 
make any claims on the product. As such another manufacturer can legally offer for sale the same 
product as long as a different process was used. 
65Oh, “Compulsory licences: recent experiences in developing countries” (2006) 1 International 
Journal of Intellectual Property Management  22. 
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countries as it has meant implementing stricter standards than those that existed 
before the advent of the Agreement.66 Ironically termed ‘minimum standards’ the 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement are actually the ‘ceiling’ for developing member 
countries, these standards are as high as developing countries can go in terms of 
implementation. 67 
 
Article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement requires that patent rights shall be made 
available to all forms of inventions subject to the principle of non-discrimination. 
Therefore, members are required to grant patent protection for inventions in all 
fields of technology. Patents shall be available and patents rights enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the field of technology.  
 
2.3.2 The WTO panel decision concerning the patent term 
This notion of “minimum standards” is further reinforced by article 33 which 
stipulates that the term for patent protection shall not expire before a period of 
twenty years has expired. The issue of the duration of patent protection has been 
before a WTO Panel in Canada- Term of Patent Protection.68 The subject of the 
dispute was section 45 of Canada’s Patent Act which provided that the patent term 
for an application before October 1989 was seventeen years from the date on which 
the patent was issued, which provision the USA challenged. The USA argued that 
section 45 was inconsistent with article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel 
came to the conclusion that as of 1 January 1996, Canada was required to fulfill the 
obligation under article 33 with regard to the inventions at issue. Canada 
subsequently noted an appeal and the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding 
that section 45 of Canada’s Patents Act was inconsistent with article 33. It is clear 
therefore that any implementation of the TRIPS obligations falling short of these 
standards can be the subject of a dispute before a WTO panel. 
                                                 
66 Oh (fn 65) 22. 
67 Correa (24) 8. 
68 (WT/ DS170/ R)/ DSR 2000: XI,  5121. 
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2.4 Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement by WTO Members 
Obligations under the Agreement are to be implemented by all Members, although 
the implementation time frames are not uniform. In view of the fact that the TRIPS 
Agreement was venturing into new areas particularly in the pharmaceutical field, 
Members agreed that transition periods beyond the entry into force of the 
Agreement on 1 January 2oo5 were necessary to allow Members time to fulfill their 
obligations.69 Article 65 stipulates that no Member shall be obliged to apply the 
Agreement’s provisions before the expiration of a general period of one year 
following the date of entry into force of the Agreement. These transition periods 
are themselves one of the flexibilities envisaged by the Agreement. 
2.4.1 Developed Members 
Article 65 (1) provides for the general one-year period transition for all Members. 
As such no Member was required to fully comply with the Agreement’s provisions 
until a year after the Agreement’s entry into force.  Developed Members had to 
implement the Agreement’s provisions a year after it came into force. Thus 
developed Members had to fully implement the Agreement’s provisions on 1 
January 1996.  
2.4.2 Developing Members  
Article 65 (2) states that a developing Member country is entitled to delay for a 
further period of four years, the date of application of the Agreement’s provisions. 
This means that the developing Members had to implement the Agreement on 1 
January 2000. Additionally article 65(4) provides that where a developing country 
Member is obliged by this Agreement “to extend product patent protection to areas 
of technology not so protectable in its territory on the general date of application” 
envisaged by article 65(2) such a Member may delay the application of the 
                                                 
69 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 70. 
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provisions on product patents for an additional period of five years.70 Therefore 
developing countries only had to grant patent protection as of 1 January 2005.  
As of 1 January 2005, when the ten year transitional period provided for in article 
65 of the TRIPS Agreement came to end, all developing countries had to grant 
patent protection. This had significant implications particularly with regards to 
pharmaceutical patents and issues accessing of medicines by patients in developing 
countries mainly because India which has long been regarded as the ‘pharmacy of 
the developing world’ has had to enact TRIPS-compliant patent legislation.71  
As already noted most developing countries did not grant patent protection prior to 
the advent of the TRIPS Agreement and those who did grant patent protection did 
so for shorter periods. However a developing country that had already granted 
patent protection before 1 January 2005, could no longer abolish or weaken such 
protection.72 This is because article 65(5) of the Agreement precludes any such roll-
back by instructing that a “Member availing itself of a transition period under 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 shall ensure that any changes in its laws, regulations and 
practice made during that period do not result in a lesser degree of consistency 
with the provisions of this Agreement”. 
 
 
                                                 
70 Only developing countries could benefit from this transition period. There is no definition of  
what a “developing country” is under WTO law, but article XVIII (1) of the GATT makes mention of 
two relevant two criteria: Members whose economies can only support low standards of living and 
are in the early stages of development. However some multilateral agreements do contain a 
definition of developing country members, for example in Annex VII of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures for purposes of determining subsidies and countervailing measures. It 
is up to a Member to decide whether they fall into the category of developing countries. Besides the 
challenge that was made by other Members relating to China’s self-identification as a developing 
country during its accession to the WTO in 1999 it is has remained largely unchallenged that two 
thirds of the WTO’s Membership consists of developing countries. 
71 In fact India issued an executive order to that effect in December 2004- Patents (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 2004, No. 7, New Delhi, 26 December 2004. After 2005 India which has been the 
source of generic antiretroviral medication for HIV/AIDS for patients in the developing world has 
had to bring its patent laws in compliance with the TRIPS Agreement with the result that India can 
no longer manufacture the generics as these on-patent drugs which had been hitherto not been 
under patent protection are now so protected. 
72 Hestermeyer (fn 53)  71 
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2.4.3 Least Developed Members 
The provisions dealing with LDCs’ transitional arrangements are to be found in 
article 66(1) of the TRIPS Agreements.73 These Members are not required to apply 
the Agreement’s provisions, other than articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of ten years 
from the date of application as defined in article 65(1). This meant that LDCs had 
until 1 January 2006 to provide patent protection.74 
 
2.4.3.1 The WTO Decision extending the transitional period of Least 
Developed Members 
However on 27 June 2002 the TRIPS Council adopted a decision to extend the 
implementation period for LDC Members.75 This Decision implements the second 
and third sentences of Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration in terms of which LDCs 
are not obliged to protect pharmaceutical patents and test data until 1 January 
2016. It is disconcerting to note however that even though least developed member 
countries are not yet under any obligation to comply with patent protection in the 
TRIPS Agreement these countries have actually proceeded and promulgated 
                                                 
73 Article 66(1) provides as follows: “In view of the special needs and requirements of least-
developed country Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints, and their 
need for flexibility to create a viable technological base, such Members shall not be required to 
apply the provisions of this Agreement, other than articles 3, 4 and 5, for a period of 10 years from 
the date of application as defined under paragraph 1 of article 65. The Council for TRIPS shall, upon 
duly motivated request by a least-developed country Member, accord extension of this period”. 
74 LDCs are clearly defined in article XI (2) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization as those countries recognized and designated as such by the United Nations (UN).  
The UN has set out three for the identification of LDCs. The first is the low-income criterion based 
on a three year average estimate of the gross national income per capita. Secondly is the human 
status criterion involving a composite Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of nutrition, 
health, education and adult literacy rate. The third criterion being the economic vulnerability 
involving a composite Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of population size, 
remoteness, merchandise export concentration, share of agriculture, forestry and fisheries in gross 
domestic product, homelessness owing to natural disasters, instability of agricultural production 
and instability of exports of goods and services. The current list of LDCs has 49 countries with 33 in 
Africa, 15 in Asia and the Pacific and one in Latin America. Available online at  
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/59/ (accessed on 10/04/09). 
75 Decision of the extension of the transition period under article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for 
least- developed country Members for Certain obligations with respect to pharmaceutical patents. 
Available online at   http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art66_1_e.htm (accessed on 
11/03/09). 
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legislation enforcing patent protection. A study carried out in 2002 showed that 
out of the thirty African least developed countries only two, Angola and Eritrea (the 
latter  is not a member of the WTO), did not grant pharmaceutical patents.76  
It is suggested that the reason behind this could be attributed to either ignorance 
on the part of these countries’ officials or external pressures form other countries 
which has led to the enactment of laws which surpass the requirements in the 
TRIPS Agreement.77 
Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration stipulates that the extension of the grace 
period for LDCs is for pharmaceutical patents only. The last sentence of paragraph 
7 is an instruction to the Council for TRIPS “to take necessary action to give effect 
to this pursuant to article 66(1) of the TRIPS Agreement”.78 In this regard 
paragraph 7 constitutes the “duly motivated request” envisaged by article 66(1).79 
LDCs therefore do not need to individually follow the procedure laid out in article 
66(1) to enjoy this period. Nonetheless the rights of LDCs to request extensions for 
other issues not linked to pharmaceutical patents in accordance with article 66(1) 
“without prejudice to the right of least-developed country Members to seek other 
extensions of the transition periods” are preserved.  
 
Unlike their developing country counterparts, LDCs can roll-back their current 
level of protection of IP to take full advantage of the flexibility in the form of the 
transition period because article 65(5) does not apply to article 66(1) of the 
Agreement.80 
 
                                                 
76 Thorpe, “Study on the implementation o the TRIPS Agreement by developing countries” (2002) 
Study Paper Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 7. 
77 Ling, “Patents and medicines: Enforce the right to public health” (2006) Third World Network 
Paper- Five years after Doha: Intellectual Property and Access to medicines Available online at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twr196.htm   (accessed on 10/03/09).   
78 “ The Decision on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement for Least- Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products” was adopted by the TRIPS Council on 27 June 2002. Effectively LDCs are 
not obliged to grant pharmaceutical patents and test data until 1 January 2016.   
79 Article 66(1) provides, inter alia, that “the Council for TRIPS shall, upon duly motivated request 
by a least-developed country Member, accord extensions of this period”.       
80 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 72. 
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Whether LDCs stand to effectively benefit from this extension with respect to 
pharmaceutical products is negligible and this is not solely due to the 
inconsequential market size of these Members.81 As already mentioned decisions 
by pharmaceutical companies to obtain patent protection are strategically made, in 
order to protect themselves from competition these companies seek to obtain 
patent protection for their inventions in jurisdictions in which factories with the 
capacity of manufacturing drugs are located.82 Enforcing patents in those countries 
effectively blocks all competitors worldwide therefore eliminating the need to 
obtain patents in countries without pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.83 
2.5 The connection between the TRIPS Agreement and Public Heath 
In 1996 the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
examined the link between public health and the TRIPS Agreement and dealt with 
this matter in a resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy.84 Ensuing resolutions 
adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2001,85 dealt with the need to assess the 
impact that the TRIPS Agreement on access to drugs, local manufacturing capacity 
and the development of new drugs. 
In June 2001 in a special session the TRIPS Council had to consider the 
relationship between public health and the TRIPS Agreement. Subsequent 
discussions in August and September of that year were held and led to the adoption 
of the Declaration.86 
The international health body the WHO which has also has described this 
relationship as “vital, complex and contested”.87 In a May 2006 resolution on 
                                                 
81 Hestermeyer  (fn 53) 72. 
82 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 72. 
83 Hestermeyer (fn 53)  73. 
84Resolution WHA49.14, 25 May 1996 in terms of which the World Health Organisation was 
instructed ‘report on the impact of the work of the WTO with respect to national drug policies and 
essential drugs and make recommendations for collaboration between WTO and WHO as 
appropriate’ 
85 Resolutions WHA54.10 and WHA54.11 
86Correa (fn 2) 2. 
87 Drager and Fuller  “Foreign policy, trade and health: at the cutting edge of global health 
diplomacy” (2007)Bulletin of the World Health Organization 162. 
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international trade and health the WHO Assembly recognised this significance, and 
called upon foreign, trade and health ministries to ensure coherency in coming up 
with national policies on trade and health.88 The trade and health relationship is 
also at the core of international trade lawmaking, particularly in the WTO with 
specific reference to the TRIPS Agreement among other multilateral treaties 
affecting health.  
2.6 The relevance of articles 7 and 8 on issues of access to essential 
medicines 
Article 7 and 8 of the TRIPS Agreement (entitled “objectives” and “principles” 
respectively) provide the framework within which IP rights are interpreted and 
implemented.89 Such an interpretation is in line with article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which stipulates that “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
Therefore each provision of the Agreement should be read in light of the objectives 
and principles in article 7 and 8.   
Article 7 provides that the “protection and enforcement and intellectual rights 
should contribute to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare”. IP rights are 
meant to benefit society by providing incentives to introduce new inventions.90 
This provision makes it clear that IP rights are not an end, rather a means to 
achieving an end.91The notion of “mutual advantage” to both producers and users 
of technological knowledge is particularly important for developing countries as 
they are largely the users of technologies abroad.92  
                                                 
88 Drager and Fuller (fn 87) 162. 
89 Correa (fn 24) 2. 
90 UNCTAD-ICTSD on IPRs and Sustainable Development, “Resource book on TRIPS and 
development” (2005) 125. 
91UNCTAD-ICTSID (fn 90) 125. 
92 UNCTAD-ICTSD (fn 90) 126. 
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These objectives establish that the protection and enforcement of IP rights do not 
exist in a vacuum, rather their purpose is to benefit the society at large and not 
aimed at the mere protection of private rights.93 
Article 8 provides that “Members may, in formulating or amending their national 
laws, adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, provided 
that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement”.  This 
allows Members to enact pro-health legislation in order to address issues of access 
to medicines. 
It has been suggested that in instances it is necessary to provide life-saving 
medication to those in need; the public interest should prevail over preserving 
patent monopoly intended to encourage inventiveness, so that the balance 
envisaged in article 7 is achieved.94These principles are vital not only for the 
purposes of  interpreting the provisions of the TRIPS agreement but also crucial for 
structuring domestic intellectual property rights legislation when responding to 
specific public health issues and other and other public interest matters. This is of 
particular relevance to developing countries that are faced by pandemics such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis among other hosts of diseases plaguing the 
continent and whose majority of citizens cannot afford the highly priced patented 
drugs. 
The issue of access to life-saving drugs is simply a replication of the original debate 
between developing and developed regarding the TRIPS Agreement itself, it is 
rooted in the differences which existed when the Agreement was negotiated.95 
Developed countries continue to maintain that high levels of IP protection are the 
necessary incentive for investment in research, which is the best guarantee of 
access to essential medicines for all countries; developing countries on the other 
                                                 
93 Elbeshbishi (fn 58) 14. 
94 Weitsman, “Eliminating barriers to the export of generic versions of patented drugs to developing 
countries from Doha to Bill C-9” (2006) Asper Review of International Business and Trade Law 3. 
95 Gathii, “The legal status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health under the Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties” (2002) 15 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 294. 
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hand argue that the Agreement fails to acknowledge the legitimate expectation of 
the end users.96  
2.7 The flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement seeks to strike a balance between the long term social 
objective of providing incentives for future inventions and creations and the short 
term objective of allowing people to use existing inventions and creations.97 The 
flexibilities are the balancing criteria that developing countries were able to attain 
to address their specific concerns over patent protection and access to medicines 
during negotiations leading up to the Agreement’s adoption.98 In the sphere of 
access to medicines an equitable balance has to be struck between the rights of 
pharmaceutical companies and the rights of the end users of the medicines such 
that there is still an incentive to pharmaceutical manufacturers to invest in 
research and development while at the same time ensuring that individuals in need 
of the medicines have access. This balance is struck by the flexibilities within the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
 
Since coming into force in 1995 the TRIPS Agreement has always made provision 
for these flexibilities with regards to patents and access to medicines however the 
reaction by some WTO members to their usage by other members was contrary to 
the provisions and the spirit of the Agreement’s flexibilities.99   
 
The flexibilities can be broadly classified into two groups namely time based in the 
form of transition periods which have already been discussed above and 
substantive flexibilities examples being exemptions from patentability,100 
                                                 
96 Gathii (fn 95) 294. 
97 WTO Agreements and public health-a joint study by the WHO and WTO Secretariat (2006) 39. 
Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/who_wto_e.pdf accessed on 
12/02/08. 
98 Osewe (fn 1) 11. 
99 Durojaye, “Compulsory Licensing in the post Doha Era: What hope for Africa” ( 2008) 
Netherlands  International Law Review 35 . 
100 Article 27 deals with patentable subject matter 
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compulsory licensing,101 public non-commercial use of a patent or government use, 
parallel importation,102 exception to patent rights,103 mailbox provisions104 and 
bolar exception (early working provision).105 
 
 
2.7.1 Exemptions from patentability 
Article 27(1) of the Agreement requires that patent be made available to any 
inventions in al fields of technology provided they fulfil the three prerequisites of 
patentability. The three preconditions are that the invention must be new, involve 
an inventive step and be capable if industrial application. Members therefore have 
flexibility in determining what can be patented in their jurisdictions. 
 
Undeniably the intent of article 27(1) is clear; however it does not mean that the 
Agreement introduced a uniform rule on patentability.106 Therefore Member 
countries have latitude of defining the ambit of patentability, depending on a 
country’s circumstances and the effect that patentability may have on the access to 
essential medicines.107  
 
The Agreement itself does not spell out what amounts to “new” or how the 
requirement of novelty should be met.108 In this regard Members can interpret and 
implement the novelty requirement by excluding from patentability the new use of 
any known pharmaceutical product.109  
 
 
 
                                                 
101 Article 31 public non-commercial use and government use fall under this article as they are a 
form of compulsory licensing. 
102 Article 6 . 
103 Article 30 . 
104 Article 70. 
105 Article 39 . 
106 Correa (fn 24) 50. 
107 Correa, “Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: Developing a public health 
perspective” (2007)  WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD Working Paper 3.  
108  Osewe (fn 1) 12. 
109 Osewe (fn 1) 12.  
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2.7.2 The early working exception 
This concept provided for in article 39 of the Agreement, also known as the “bolar 
exception”,110 allows for the testing and establishment of the bioequivalence of a 
generic version before expiry of the patent, it provides opportunity for research and 
experimentation.111 This mechanism which entails making use of an invention 
without the patent holder’s permission for purposes of obtaining approval of the 
generic product before the patent’s expiration may allow the marketing of a generic 
version immediately after the patent expires.112 Since generic competition results in 
lower prices this exception promotes the affordability of off-patent drugs. 113 
 
2.7.3 Compulsory licensing and government use  
The TRIPS Agreement in article 31 entitled ‘other use without authorization of the 
right holder’ regulates the mechanism commonly referred to as compulsory 
licensing.114 Compulsory licensing is a procedure whereby a non-voluntary license 
is granted by a competent authority for example an administrative or judicial body 
of a government to a third party to exploit a patented invention, without the 
permission of the patent holder.115    
 
                                                 
110 It is so named “bolar” after a case which appeared before the USA courts in Roche Products Inc. 
vs. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. (733.F.2d.858, Fed. Cir., cert. denied 469 US 856, 1984). It was first 
introduced in the USA by the U.S. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1954. Subsequently it has been explicitly adopted by countries such as Canada, Australia, Israel, 
Argentina and Thailand. In the majority of European countries it has been recognized by judicial 
precedence on the experimental use exception. 
111 Osewe (fn 1) 22.  
112 Correa, “Integrating public health concerns into patent legislation in developing countries 
“(2000) (South Perspectives Series) South Centre, 68.  Available online at 
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=678&Itemid=1 
(accessed on 15/04/09).  
113 Correa(fn 112)  69. 
114 Article 31 provides that “where the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a 
patent without authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties 
authorized by the government”, provided that certain conditions are met. These conditions include 
the requirement that efforts must be made to negotiate a voluntary licence with the patent holder 
prior to granting a compulsory licence however article 31 (b) waives this requirement in cases of 
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use, that such use shall be limited to the purpose to which it authorized, the patent 
holder must be paid adequate remuneration, among others.   
It is interesting to note that the term ‘compulsory licence’ does not feature within the TRIPS 
Agreement; it is in paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration that the term is expressly mentioned for the 
first time. 
115 ICTSD (fn 90) 461. 
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The nature of a patent is such that it confers upon the holder exclusive rights in the 
exploitation of the invention (which can be a product or process).116 A patent 
confers upon the holder the right to lawfully prevent third parties from exploiting 
or using the patented invention.  
 
A compulsory licence restrains the exercise of private rights in the public interest, it 
being acknowledged that in certain situations public interest in accessing 
technological knowledge may trump the interests of the patent holder.117 
 
Compulsory licensing is a significant mechanism that developing countries can 
incorporate into their domestic legislation in order to augment efforts towards 
access to essential medicines and plays pivotal role in ensuring that public health 
needs are satisfied.118   
 
In terms of article 31 compulsory licences that can be issued either issued for public 
non commercial purposes also known as government use or it can be issued for 
private purposes. The fundamental difference between the two is that with the 
former the use of the patent is strictly limited to public non-commercial use while 
with the latter it includes both private and commercial use.119 As already noted the 
requirement to negotiate a voluntary licence is waived where the licence if for 
public non-commercial use thereby ensuring a simpler procedure and allowing a 
government use licence to be “fast tracked” which is crucial for essential 
medicines.120 
 
However article 31(f) provides that products manufactured under a compulsory 
licence must be predominantly for the supply of the domestic supply. This 
presented a problem to countries without the capacity to manufacture hence the 
                                                 
116 Article 28 provides that patent rights shall be exclusive while article 33 stipulates that the 
minimum term for patent protection shall be 20 years. 
117 ICTSD (fn) 461. 
118 Musungu (fn 4) 27. 
119 Musungu (fn 4) 35. 
120 Musungu (fn 4) 36. 
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General Council’s Decision of 30 August 2003 recognizes these difficulties and 
sought to address them. 
 
The adoption of the 30 August Decision has brought into existence a second form 
of compulsory licensing which was not possible before. In terms of the 30 August 
Decision a compulsory licence can now be granted specifically to enable the 
production of generic versions of patented medicines for exportation to a foreign 
country lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
 
 According to the TRIPS Agreement, members of the WTO are only limited with 
regard to the procedure and conditions to be followed in the grant of compulsory 
licensing while they retain the liberty of establishing the grounds for granting 
compulsory licences.121 In this regard article 31 lays out the relevant provisions and 
procedures that governments are required to follow when granting a compulsory 
licence and lays out certain terms that compulsory licences should embody. 
Although the Agreement refers to some of the possible grounds for granting 
compulsory licences for pharmaceutical patents, such as the case of national 
emergency, situation of extreme urgency, as a measure to remedy ant-competitive 
conduct inter alia, this list is not exhaustive and therefore the possible grounds for 
the granting of a compulsory are not limited to the instances given.122 This 
therefore leaves developing countries with flexibility to determine whether to grant 
compulsory licensing in order to satisfy public health needs. The flexibility to 
determine the grounds were reiterated in paragraph 5(b) of the Doha 
Declaration.123 
 
                                                 
121 Correa (fn 24) 90. 
122 Correa  (fn 24 ) 90 
123 Paragraph 5(b) of the Declaration states that “each member has the right to grant compulsory 
licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.  
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2.7.4 Parallel importation 
Article 6 provides for this flexibility.124 Parallel importation is comparison- 
shopping at international level which allows the importation of patented products 
sold cheaper in another country thereby improving pricing equity and increasing 
the probability of fair pricing between countries.125 
 
2.7.4.1 The doctrine of exhaustion 
The underlying concept of parallel importation is based on the principle of 
exhaustion of rights, founded on the premise that the patent holder has been 
rewarded through the first sale or distribution of the product and therefore no 
longer has the right to control the use or resale of the product.126 The doctrine of 
exhaustion deals with the point at which point the patent holder loses the control 
over product or process.127 In the absence of exhaustion, the holder will have 
perpetual control over any dealings regarding that product; therefore the doctrine 
allows free movement of the product without disruption from the original IP right 
holder as it were.128 Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration reiterates the 
provision of article 6 by stipulating that Members have flexibility in implementing 
their own regime for such exhaustion without challenge. 
 
The rights that come with the granting of a patent have a territorial effect in that 
the holder of the right is conferred the exclusive right to preclude others from 
making use of the patented product or process in the country in which this right 
                                                 
124 Article 6 provides that “for the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to 
articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights.” 
Article 3 deals with national treatment and provides that “a country shall accord to the nationals of 
other Members treatment no less favourable than it accords its own national with regard to the 
protection of intellectual property”. Article 4 deals with the most-favoured treatment principle and 
provides that “with regard to the protection of intellectual protection, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members”. 
125 Baker, “Processes and issues for improving access to medicines: Willingness and ability to utilise 
TRIPS flexibilities in non-producing countries” (2004)  DFID HSRC Issue Paper 21. Available 
online at http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/atm/Baker.pdf ( accessed on 03/10/08). 
126  Correa (fn 24) 81. 
127 ICTSD (fn 90) 93. 
128ICTSD  (fn 90) 93. 
 
 
 
 
 32
was awarded.129 Therefore an inventor will have to acquire a patent in the different 
countries where he or she wishes to get protection for the invention.130 Without a 
patent in particular country a patentee cannot validly preclude others from 
exploiting an invention in that particular jurisdiction if the inventor does not have 
a patent granted there.  
 
Parallel importation offers an avenue to developing countries by facilitating the 
importation of patented products form countries where they are sold at lower 
prices into countries where the same products are sold at higher prices.131  
 
Parallel importation of patented medicines from a country where it is sold at a 
lower price will enable more patients in the importing country to have access to 
medicines which they would otherwise not have had. Such measures would also not 
prevent the patent owner from receiving remuneration for the patent and the 
product is first sold. In this regard, parallel importation is a legitimate measure, 
which WTO members are permitted to adopt so as to protect public health and 
nutrition as stipulated by article 8.  
 
The movement of the product across the borders is considerably affected by the 
exhaustion doctrine that a Member may choose.132  
 
2.7.4.2 International exhaustion 
Under international exhaustion a patented product may be imported into the 
territory of a country from anywhere in the world where the product is offered for 
sale by the patent holder or an authorized party.133  
 
 
                                                 
129 Du Plessis, “The TRIPS Agreement and South African legislation: the case of parallel importation 
of medicines” (1999) 3 Law, Democracy and Development 60. 
130 However there are regional intellectual systems that exist for example ARIPO (African Regional 
Intellectual Property Organisation). 
131 Osewe (fn 1) 20. 
132 Ibid UNCTAD-ICTSD (fn 90) 94. 
133 Musungu (fn 4) 47. 
 
 
 
 
 33
2.74.3 Regional exhaustion  
Regional exhaustion on the other hand permits the importation of a patented 
product into a country’s borders from any other member of the regional 
configuration.134  
 
2.7.4.4 National exhaustion 
Lastly national exhaustion only restricts the circulation of the product within the 
borders of one country- clearly with national exhaustion parallel importation is 
impossible.135  
 
Simply put, with international exhaustion, the product can move freely across the 
borders after it has been placed first put on the market anywhere in the world. 
Under regional exhaustion, the movement of the product outside of the region may 
be blocked by the patent holder, while under national exhaustion the product can 
only freely move within the borders of that particular country only in which it has 
been first marketed. 
 
 
All three forms of importation are compliant with the TRIPS Agreement; it cannot 
be the cause or basis for an action or dispute to be raised before the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body unless the fundamental principles of non-discrimination are 
involved.136 Therefore countries with little or no manufacturing capacities, 
especially developing and least developed countries can legitimately incorporate 
the principle of international exhaustion of rights in national legislation for pro-
health policies in order to improve access to medicines without the interests of the 
patent holder being abrogated. Moreover article 28(1)(a) of the TRIPS Agreement 
which deals with the exclusive rights conferred by a patent has a footnote which 
stipulates that this right is subject to the provisions of article 6 with regards to the 
use, sale, importation or other distribution of goods. 
                                                 
134 Musungu (fn 4 ) 47. 
135 Musungu (fn 4) 48. 
136 Correa  (fn 24) 82. 
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  2.7.5 Mailbox provisions 
This flexibility is provided for in article 70(8) of the TRIPS Agreement which 
requires that during transition periods Members must put in place a system of 
filing of patent applications which became commonly known as the “mail box” 
system.137 Article 70(9) requires that where a patent application is filed in terms of 
article 70(8) exclusive marketing rights shall be granted for a period of five 
years.138 Since the transition period for developing countries lapsed in 2005, they 
can no longer make us of this flexibility; rather they are now obliged to process the 
patent application filed in terms of article 70(8) and grant patent protection. LDCs 
however can still make use of the mail box provision as their transition period was 
extended to 2016 regarding pharmaceutical patents.  
 
2.8 Implementation of the flexibilities in the pre- Doha era 
As already shown in the preceding discussion the TRIPS Agreement has always, 
since its adoption, made provision for flexibilities with regards to patents and 
access to medicines. Attempts by some governments to make use of this policy 
space provided for by the TRIPS Agreement was often met by resistance, threats of 
cross-retaliation in other sectors of trade and even threats of the imposition of 
sanctions.  
 
Member countries such as Brazil, India, South Africa and Thailand are among 
those who have undertaken insistent action to promote public health interests, in 
the face of strenuous objection from the USA government and the pharmaceutical 
industry.139 The controversial actions by the USA together with the pharmaceutical 
                                                 
137 Article 70(8)(a) requires that “where a Member does not make available as of the date of entry 
into force of the WTO Agreement patent protection for pharmaceutical products commensurate 
with its obligations under article 27, that Member shall: 
(a)Provide as from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement a means by which 
applications for patents for such inventions can be filed”. 
138 Article 70(9) requires that “where a product is the subject of a patent application in a Member in 
accordance with paragraph 8(a) , exclusive marketing rights shall be granted for a period of five 
years after obtaining marketing approval or until a product patent is granted or rejected in that 
Member, which ever is shorter”.  
139 Abbott, “The TRIPS-legality of measures taken to address public health crises: Responding to 
USTR-state-industry positions that undermine the WTO” (2002) The political Economy of 
international trade law-Essays in honor of Robert E. Hudec 317. 
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industry contradict the statements made by the USA largely confirming that the 
TRIPS Agreement prohibits neither compulsory licences nor parallel importation 
of patented pharmaceuticals.140 
 
2.8.1 South Africa’s Medicines Amendment Act  
The South African pharmaceutical trial highlights such issues and it provided the 
impetus to address the issues of access to essential medicines in the WTO which 
led to the adoption of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. Prior to the 
Declaration, the South African government faced with an epidemic of 
unprecedented levels had made a decision to keep medication affordable, a 
decision which was influenced by the fact that drug prices in South Africa were at 
times higher than in some developed countries.141 The President of South Africa 
signed into law the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control 
Amendment Act142 , and one of its objectives was to make available procedures for 
the supply of more affordable medicines in certain situations. Among the measures 
therein was the highly contested section 15(c) conferring authority upon the 
Minister of Health to prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable 
medication by limiting patent rights and allowing the Minister to use parallel 
imports and compulsory licensing. In response to this several multinational 
pharmaceutical companies filed suit against the South African government 
challenging these provisions in the case Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ 
Association et al v President of the Republic of South Africa.143 The 
pharmaceutical industry argued the provisions of the act were in violation of the 
Constitution of South Africa, namely the right to property. Finally the provision 
was alleged to be inconsistent with article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement as it 
discriminated against patent rights in the pharmaceutical field.  
 
 
                                                 
140Abbott (fn 139) 321. 
141Hestermeyer (fn 53) 12.   
142 The Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act No.90 of 1997 which amended 
the principal Act No. 101 of 1965. 
143 High Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) Case No. 4183/98, notice of motion 
issued in 1998.  
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2.8.1.1 The USA’s Special Watch list 
In addition to the lawsuit filed against the President of South Africa the USA also 
responded by placing South Africa on its ‘Special 301’ watch list.144 Section 301 of 
the 1974 Act is arguably the most obvious contentious mechanism in America’s 
trade remedy arsenal.145 The USA also withheld preferential treatment under the 
Generalized System of Preference on four items. In response the government of 
South Africa pointed out that under the constitution of South Africa it was obliged 
to protect the health of its citizens. Effectively the lawsuit filed by the 
pharmaceutical companies put the issue of access to medicines and the TRIPS 
Agreement on the international agenda.146  
 
It is interesting to note the controversial section 301 was confirmed by a WTO 
Panel decision in 1999 in US-Section 301 Trade Act. 147 The Panel concluded that 
the relevant section was not inconsistent with the provisions of the DSU.148 
However the panel held that section 301 could, in future, become inconsistent with 
the USA’s obligations if applied differently. This panel decision was criticized as 
being “political” rather than a rules-based “legal-judgment”, based not upon the 
letter of the USA’s law that enables unilateralism, but on the USA’s administration 
                                                 
144 This is a list of countries that deny adequate and effective intellectual property , reasoning that 
the Act granted the Minister of Health an ill-defined authority to authorize parallel imports, issue 
compulsory licenses, and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights. This list contains foreign 
countries pursuing the most onerous policies which have immense adverse impact on US right 
holders or products, and are subjected to accelerated investigations and possible sanctions 
145 Bhala, “International Trade law: theory and practice” 2ed (2001) 1268. 
This section authorizes the President to enforce the rights of the USA under international trade 
agreements and take unilateral action against unfair trade policies. Since the Act’s adoption the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR) has undertaken numerous Section 301 investigations, 
the most common targets being the EU, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan being the most targeted. The 
unilateral nature of section 301, coupled with the retaliatory measures it authorizes has led to its 
criticism on grounds that it is inconsistent with GATT and the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). 
146 The case gained attention from international media, Non –Governmental Organizations such as 
South Africa’s TAC (Treatment Action Campaign), among others. Finally the pressure became too 
much that the pharmaceutical industry made the decision to withdraw their lawsuit. 
147 DS152.  
The European Communities complained that the measure at issue was section 310 of the Trade Act 
of 1974 which authorizes certain actions by the Office of the USTR, such as the suspension or 
withdrawal of concessions or the imposition of duties or other import restrictions in response to 
trade barriers imposed by other countries.   
148 Article 23 (2)(a) of the DSU is to the effect that it is only through the WTO’s DSU that a 
determination can be made regarding the violation or other nullification or impairment of benefits. 
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undertakings.149  Nonetheless pressure from the international community and 
several NGOs forced the pharmaceutical industry to withdraw the suit and the US 
government also caved in and removed South Africa From its Special 301 watch 
list.150  In short the lawsuit degenerated into public relations disaster for the 
pharmaceutical industry and after threats that the amount of public funding in the 
development of the relevant drugs would be made known in the hearings, the 
industry had no choice but to settle.151South Africa is not the only country which 
has felt the repercussions of utilizing these health safeguard measures. 
 
2.8.2 Article 68(1) of Brazil’s Industrial Property Law  
Brazil also bore the brunt of US’s retaliation when the US brought a claim relating 
to TRIPS consistency of the Brazilian legal framework for the grant of compulsory 
licenses. On 30 May 2000, the US requested consultations with Brazil under the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement mechanism.152 These consultations concerned 
provisions of Brazil’s 1996 industrial property law.153  Article 68(1) of this statute 
requires that the patent holder manufactures the patented product in Brazil.154 This 
provision made the exclusive enjoyment of patent rights subject to a ‘local working 
requirement’. As such for a patentee to enjoy the rights flowing from a patent they 
had to produce or ‘work’ the patented subject matter locally in the territory of 
Brazil and this requirement could not be satisfied by importation of the patented 
subject matter concerned into Brazil.  Brazil’s industrial property law went on to 
define ‘failure to be worked’ as ‘failure to manufacture or incomplete manufacture 
of the product’, or ‘failure to make full use of the patented process’. Therefore if 
                                                 
149 Raghavan, “WTO panel upholds US sanctions law”. Available online at 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/uphold-cn.htm  accessed on 23/04/09. 
150 An executive order by President Clinton forbidding the US to seek the revision of intellectual 
property laws of Sub-Saharan African countries that promote access to medicines made the way for 
bringing to an end  the “Special 301” action against South Africa 
151 Barton, “TRIPS and the global pharmaceutical market: Can the pharmaceutical industry make 
drugs available to developing countries without compromising its research incentive?”  (2004) 23 
Health Issues 146. 
152 Request for Consultations by the United States , Brazil- Measurers Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/1, G/L/385, IP/D/23,8 June 2000 
153 Law No. 9.279 of 14 May 1996 to Regulate Rights and Obligations Relating to Industrial Property 
154 Article 68(1) authorizes the granting of a compulsory licence on grounds of “failure to work the 
subject matter of a patent on the territory of Brazil, failure to manufacture or incomplete 
manufacture of the product or failure to completely use a patented process, except for failure to 
work due to lack of economic viability, in which importing shall be admitted.” 
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this ‘failure’ occurred and the ‘local working’ requirement was not satisfied, the 
government can issue a compulsory license, unless the patent holder can show that 
local production is not viable. The US’s argument was that the “local working” 
requirement was a protective industrial policy mechanism and incompatible with 
the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. The US’s contention was that this 
requirement was inconsistent with Brazil’s obligations under articles 27 and 28 of 
the TRIPS Agreement and article III of the GATT 1994.155 Brazil was of the view 
that this provision was a necessary component of its efforts to combat HIV/AIDS 
and was fully compatible with the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. Brazil also 
insisted that this law was pivotal to the country’s public health policy. In January 
2001 the US requested for the establishment of a panel.156 Brazil’s threat of 
compulsory licensing was instrumental in successfully negotiating with 
pharmaceutical companies to reduce the price of imported anti-retroviral 
medication. On June 25, 2001 the US government withdrew its WTO complaint 
against Brazil prior to the submission of written pleadings by either party. In turn 
Brazil agreed to hold talks with the US before applying article 68(1). 157  
 
2.8.3 The anthrax threat 
The response by the US to other governments utilizing the TRIPS flexibilities 
displays case double standards. Following the 11/09/01 terror attacks on the USA, 
a threat of anthrax emerged prompting governments of the USA and Canada to 
stockpile the only antibiotic for anthrax Cipro, whose patent was held by the 
German pharmaceutical company Bayer in both countries. The USA also 
                                                 
155 Article 27 deals with the ‘patentable subject matter’, article 28 sets out the basic rights for patent 
holders and article III of GATT 1994 is the national treatment applicable to trade in goods. 
156 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Brazil- Measures Affecting Patent 
Protection, WT/DS199/39, January 2001. 
157In a Joint Communication Brazil- Unites States, 25 June 2001 which followed the US’s 
notification of its decision to withdraw its complaint (without prejudice), the communication 
declared as follows: 
“The Brazilian Government will agree, in the event it deems necessary to apply article 68 to grant a 
compulsory license on a patent held by a US company, to provide advance notice and adequate 
opportunity for prior talks on the matter with the United States. These talks are to be held within 
the scope of the US-Brazil Consultative Mechanism, in a special session scheduled to discuss the 
subject. 
Brazil and the United States consider that this agreement is an important step towards greater 
cooperation between the two countries regarding our shared goals of fighting AIDS and protecting 
intellectual property rights”   
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threatened to break the patent for an anthrax drug held by a pharmaceutical 
company if the company would not make considerable price concessions in order 
to meet the demand for the drug. Cipla the Indian generics maker which produced 
the generic version of the brand-name drug and sold it at substantially lower prices 
offered to provide Cipro to the USA. This state of affairs was quite ironic in that 
Cipla, which is a major supplier of HIV/AIDS generics and therefore at loggerheads 
with the USA and Pharma, was actually offering a generic version of the patented 
drug Cipro to the USA.158 
 
 The pharmaceutical company Bayer ultimately agreed to supply the drug at much 
reduced prices.159 This gave rise to close analyses of the TRIPS Agreement’s 
provisions with experts in intellectual property matters confirming that the actions 
by the South African government were indeed TRIPS-compliant.160  
 
The challenge by the US of South Africa’s Medicines Act displays hypocrisy on the 
part of the US. This is because the US under USC 1498 also has similar provisions 
dealing with compulsory licensing. In terms of these provisions the US government 
may use or authorize a third party to use patents for virtually any public purpose. 
The US government does not have to seek a license or negotiate for the use of the 
patent or copyright. The patent holder is entitled to ‘reasonable and entire 
compensation’, but may not have recourse to injunctive relief to prevent the use of 
the patent. An analogous mechanism also exists in the United Kingdom161 with 
regard to the ‘Crown use’ of a patent whereby the use of a patent ‘in the service of 
the Crown’ without prior consent of the patent holder is not considered an 
infringement of the patent.  It defeats the mind as to why the US could challenge 
South Africa’s actions when it had the same domestic procedure. The change in the 
US government’s stance compared to the South Africa trial did not go unnoticed.162 
It put the USA government in a weaker position regarding when defending its 
                                                 
158 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 16. 
159 Sun, “The road to Doha and beyond: Some reflections of the TRIPS Agreement and public 
health” (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 5. 
160 Sun (fn 159) 6. 
161 United Kingdom Patents Act 1977 
162 Hestermeyer,(fn 53) 17. 
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actions in the South African and Brazilian cases. Therefore the uncompromising 
attitude of western countries such as the USA and Canada could not be maintained 
in the light of the anthrax episode.163 
 
Conclusion 
It is against this background then that the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health was adopted in order to clarify the uncertainties that existed at the time. 
The foregoing indicates the stages that the protection of intellectual property has 
evolved over time, the atmosphere in which the TRIPS Agreement was finally 
adopted as ‘part of the package’. The discussion also indicates the resistance that 
developing countries met when implementing the safeguards in the TRIPS 
Agreement and this proved to be the impetus of the adoption of the separate 
Declaration on TRIPS and public health. One can say that the fears and 
reservations that developing country members had in their reluctance to negotiate 
and adopt the TRIPS Agreement have materialized in the sphere of patents and 
access to medicines 
 
The global synchronized basic IP standards have indeed achieved the protection 
and promotion of investment in innovation, by limiting free-riders; nonetheless the 
same standards have tremendously limited the long-established capacity of 
suppliers of public goods such as health care, to tackle the main concerns of the 
less affluent of society particularly (although not limited to) developing 
countries.164 
 
It has been shown that although patent protection is meant to provide the 
prerequisite to enhancing creativity by promoting investment (or R&D) this pursuit 
must be done in tandem with developmental dictates. It has also been shown that 
even developed countries have at one point in their history implemented weaker 
patent frameworks in order to achieve their developmental needs. The advent of 
the TRIPS has changed the landscape dramatically with the Agreement imposing 
                                                 
163 Hoen, “TRIPS, pharmaceutical patents, and access to essential medicines: a long way from 
Seattle to Doha” (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 8. 
164 Abbott and Reichman (fn 39) 921. 
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minimum standards for IP protection. All Members, except LDCs, are obliged to 
grant patent protection for all inventions in all fields without discrimination with 
the result that countries can no longer exclude from patentability pharmaceutical 
product and processes from patent protection. Admittedly Members can make use 
of the so-called flexibilities and implement less restrictive requirements for 
patentability. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 
       THE DOHA DECLARATION AND 30 AUGUST DECISION          
       
 
This chapter begins with a discussion on the Doha Round’s development agenda 
and its bearing on issues of access to essential medicines. The provisions of the 
Doha Declaration, the flexibilities it affirmed and its legal status are looked at. The 
Decision waiving the requirement in article 31(f) which created a new compulsory 
licence the legal status of the Decision as well as some of the criticisms leveled 
against the Decision are also considered. 
 
3.1 A brief discourse on Doha’s Development Agenda.  
The November 2001 Declaration at the WTO’s Fourth Ministerial Conference in 
Doha, Qatar, presented the mandate of negotiations on a various areas, and other 
work including issues concerning the implementation of the present  WTO 
agreements. The main Ministerial Doha Declaration in paragraph 2 recognizes the 
need for all peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities and welfare gains 
(emphasis mine) that the multilateral trading system brings. It also takes 
cognizance of the reality that the majority of the WTO’s membership consists of 
developing countries, to that end Members seek to place the needs and interests of 
developing countries at the heart of the Work Programme adopted in the 
Declaration.165 
 
The Doha Declaration is a critical step in making the TRIPS Agreement more 
development friendly.166 It is significant in that for the first time developing 
countries decisively negotiated for a development friendly outcome.167 To that end, 
it is a vital milestone in the TRIPS debate, as it paves the way for a more pro- 
                                                 
165 Under the title Working Programme there are 21 subjects listed. One of them is in paragraph 17 
and it is the issue dealing with TRIPS and public health, it is this particular paragraph which 
formed the basis of the adoption of the separate declaration on TRIPS and public health. 
166 Elbeshbishi, (fn 58)4. 
167  Elbeshbishi (fn 58 ) 3.  
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public health interpretation by explicitly acknowledging the IP rights are 
subservient to public health concerns.168 
 
The World Bank has also reiterated the need for ensuring that the Doha mandate 
on TRIPS and public health is achieved.169 The World Bank highlighted the fact 
that promoting poor people’s access to medication and vaccines is pivotal to the 
alleviation of poverty, more so in light of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As a means to 
achieving access to medicines by the world’s poor, the Bank urged countries to 
actively engage in good faith to achieve the development agenda which is at the 
core of the Doha Round.170 
 
The protection of IP rights also creates a monopoly which may collide with certain 
fundamental social needs such as public health.171 While IP rights may not provide 
an incentive in a context of low levels of development, they may have considerable 
negative consequences on development, for instance by, limiting access to 
medicines.172 
 
The gap between rich and poor countries negatively impacts on global health and 
even impedes development, contributes to the ever widening North-South divide it 
has also been identified as one of the major challenges of the 21st century.173  
 
3.2 The Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
                                                 
168  Elbeshbishi (fn 58) 4  
169 Fink, “Implementing the Doha Mandate on TRIPS and public health” Trade Note-International 
Trade Department, World Bank, May (2003). Available online at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/trips.htm (accessed on 12/04/09).  
170 Fink (fn 169). 
171 Correa, “Reshaping the intellectual property system and development perspective- Views on the 
future of intellectual property system”  ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, 
Selected Issues Brief No.1 (June 2007) 26. Available online at             
http://www.frederickabbott.com/uploads/ICTSD_Views_20Future_20IP_20System.pdf. 
(accessed on 15/04/09). 
172 Correa (fn 171) 2. 
173 Lown, “The developing world and The New England Journal of Medicine” (2006) 2 Globalization 
and Health 1. Available online at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/3  (accessed 
14/04/09). 
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On 14 November 2001 Ministers adopted a special and separate Declaration on 
TRIPS and public health.174 Despite the initial resistance by some developed 
countries, notably the US, the Declaration was adopted by consensus on the basis 
of last minute compromises and a delicate balance of wording.175 While the 
leadership of the WTO, its Members and scholars generally exhorted the 
Declaration, the pharmaceutical industry predicted that it would threaten 
incentives for research and development.176 
 
3.2.1 Scope of the Declaration 
In Paragraph 1 Members recognize the ‘gravity’ of the public health afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, particularly those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics.177  The reference made to 
specific epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria does not imply that 
the Declaration is limited to them.178 In addition to the list not being exhaustive, 
the stress on diseases “afflicting many developing and least-developed countries” 
gives some flexibility in relation to diseases that are peculiar to those Members. 179  
 
3.2.2 The role of TRIPS and intellectual property rights 
                                                 
174 WT/ MIN(01)/ DEC/ 2 Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
adopted on 14 November 2001. 
Paragraph 17 of the main Declaration  states that, ‘we stress the importance and interpretation of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual  Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a 
manner supportive of public health, by promoting both access to existing medicines and research 
and development into new medicines and, in this connection, are adopting a separate declaration.”  
175 In particular developing countries discarded for study their original position requesting for the 
Declaration to state that ‘Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement shall prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health’  (IP/ C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450, 4 October 2001), which had 
been one of the main points of contention during the preparatory work. Finally the wording that 
was agreed upon was “We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent 
Members from taking measures to protect public health”. 
176 Hestermeyer (53) 261. 
177 While some developed countries made attempts to limit the scope of the Declaration to the HIV/ 
AIDS crisis, in this regard the USA supported by Switzerland proposed a text that referred to ‘health 
crisis’, ‘pandemics’ and ‘infectious diseases’ only. Nonetheless the adopted text is a manifestation of 
the concerns of developing and least-developed countries about the implications of the TRIPS 
Agreement with regard to public health in general, without limitation to certain diseases. 
178 The Declaration covers any ‘public health problem ’, as the anthrax threat soon after the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US demonstrates as well as those that may be derived from 
diseases that affect the population in developing countries such as asthma or cancer, for example. 
179 Gervais (fn 36)398.  
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Paragraph 2 urges Members to regard the TRIPS Agreement as being part of both 
national and international efforts in addressing health problems. This means that 
countries can make use of the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement even at national 
level to address their health needs. 
 
Paragraph 3 recognizes the importance of intellectual property protection ‘for the 
development of new medicines’. The Doha Declaration recognizes that the high 
prices of medicines as a result of patent protection are part of the severe problems 
facing developing and least-developed countries and is a ‘concern’ that needs to be 
dealt with. The consensus achieved on the impact of patent protection on drug 
prices may be considered one of the major political achievements of the developing 
countries in the Declaration.180 
 
3.2.3 Public health measures 
The fourth paragraph states in clear terms that “the Agreement does not and 
should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health”. The 
wording of the first part of paragraph 4 that the TRIPS Agreement “does not and 
should not prevent Members’ rights to take measures ‘to protect public health’’ is 
arguably the most controversial mainly because of the opposing interest between 
developed and developing Members and therefore reflects a delicate compromise 
between Members.181  
 
3.2.4 Flexibility in the TRIPS Agreement 
The last part of paragraph 4 echoes one of the major concerns raised by developing 
countries in the process leading to the Doha Ministerial, mainly the opposition 
when implementing the flexibilities. The importance of this paragraph is found in 
the fact that the Declaration was adopted for this very purpose-to clarify the 
flexibilities. The confirmation that the TRIPS Agreement has left room for 
maneuvering at the national level has crucial political and legal implication, in that 
pressures to impede the use of available flexibilities run counter to the spirit and 
                                                 
180 Correa (fn 2) 7. 
181 Correa (fn 2) 9. 
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purpose of the Agreement.182 In legal terms, such confirmation means that in 
matters before panels issues of public health shall be taken into consideration.183 
 
3.2.5 Interpretation 
The chapeau of paragraph 5 balances the interests of IP owners, on the one hand, 
and users, on the other, in that while it recognizes the importance of patents in 
promoting innovation, the effect of patents on prices is also acknowledged. This 
paragraph reinforces the availability of the flexibilities to Members pursuing pro-
health goals. The Declaration goes beyond merely confirming the relevance of 
article 7 and 8 but it also provides an understanding about the purpose of the 
TRIPS Agreement in relation to public health issues, which should guide any future 
decisions by panels and Appellate Body dealing with such issues.184  
 
3.2.6 Compulsory licences 
 Developing countries had singled out compulsory licensing as the most crucial tool 
when addressing public policy issues particularly in ensuring the availability of 
alternative sources for the supply of medicines at lower prices as a result of 
increased competition.185. Compulsory licensing is important as it increases 
competition as a result of which prices of drugs are reduced.186 Subparagraph 5 (b) 
although it does not add anything substantive to provisions relating to compulsory 
licensing it is in this paragraph that the term “compulsory licence” is explicitly 
mentioned. It must be noted that although article 31 refers to some of the possible 
grounds for issuing compulsory licences, this list is not exclusive.187 
 
3.2.7 Emergency  
Sub-paragraph 5(c) affirms Members’ right to determine “what constitutes national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. Such determination in 
                                                 
182 Correa (fn 2) 13. 
183  Correa (fn 2) 14. 
184 Correa (fn 2) 14. 
185 Correa (fn 2) 15. 
186 Sekalala, “Beyond Doha: Seeking access to essential medicines for HIV/ AIDS through the World 
Trade Organization” (2008) 9. 
187 Discussed at length at 36. 
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making use of the Agreement’s flexibilities or the adoption of other measures 
permitted under article 8(1) of the Agreement.188  
 
Paragraph 5 (c ) clarifies that “public health crises” can represent “a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”, thereby allowing for the 
granting of compulsory licences when provided under national law and pursuant to 
TRIPS article 31(b), without the obligation for prior negotiation with the patent 
holder.189 The mention of “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics is 
indicative of the fact that an “emergency” may be not only a short-term problem, 
but a long lasting situation, as is the case with epidemics given as examples.190 
Lastly it clarifies that if a Member disputes the qualification of a particular state of 
affairs by another Member as being a “national emergency or other circumstances 
of extreme urgency”, the burden of proving the non-existence of such a state of 
affairs rests with the complaining Member.191 
 
3.2.8 Parallel importation 
Paragraph 5(c) also reiterates the provisions of article 6 regarding the doctrine of 
exhaustion and provides that Members have the flexibility of establishing any 
regime of their choice. The issue of parallel importation was one of the issues that 
the pharmaceutical industry had challenged, and as such developing countries 
were very interested in ensuring that it was also re-affirmed.192 
 
3.2.9 Members lacking sufficient manufacturing capacity 
Paragraph 6 of the Declaration recognizes the problems that Members with 
insufficient manufacturing capacity may encounter when effectively implementing 
the issuance of compulsory licences. To remedy this problem Members instructed 
                                                 
188 Correa(fn 2) 16. 
189 Correa (fn 2) 16. 
190 Correa (fn 2) 17. 
191 Correa (fn 2 ) 17. 
192 Correa (fn 2) 17. 
It was  one of the grounds upon which the pharmaceutical industry challenged South Africa’s 
Medicines Act discussed in the previous chapter.  
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the Council for TRIPS to “find an expeditious solution to this problem and to 
report to the General Council before the end of 2002”.193 
 
Article 31(f) requires that manufacture of a product in terms of a compulsory 
licence must be predominantly for the supply of the licencee’s domestic market,194 
unless the licence was issued to rectify anti-competitive practices.195 The primary 
problem that paragraph 6 seeks to address is that of lack of capacity to 
manufacture drugs prevalent among developing countries and LDCs. The 
limitation in sub-article 31(f) effectively prevented the granting of compulsory 
licences to supply the foreign markets. 
 
3.3 Legal Status of the Declaration 
It is important to determine the legal status of declarations in the WTO set-up so as 
understand what effect it will have on Members. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties instructs that a treaty should be interpreted in good faith making 
use of the ordinary meaning of its terms in the context and light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose.196  
 
There is no consensus regarding the status of the Declaration, with some 
academics suggesting that it does not have legal value as it does not constitute an 
authoritative interpretation in terms of article IX(2) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement.197 Many are of the view that the plain meaning of “We agree” used in 
the Declaration should be an indication that it is a binding agreement.198 
                                                 
193 This deadline was missed as the solution was only adopted in 2003-the 30 August 2003 
Decision.  
194 Article 31 stipulates that “where the law of a member allows for use of the subject matter of a 
patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or  third 
parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: 
(f) any such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member authorizing such use”. 
195 Article 31(k) provides, inter alia, that “Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth 
in sub-paragraph (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti-competitive”. 
196 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (herein after the Vienna 
Convention). 
197Hestermeyer (53) 279.  
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3.3.1 The Declaration as a subsequent agreement under article 31(3) (a) 
of the Vienna Convention 
The Vienna Convention requires tribunals to take into account any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions when interpreting a treaty.199 The Ministerial 
Conference which adopted the Declaration has the authority to take on decisions 
on all matters under any of the Multilateral Agreements.200 
 
The fact that the legitimate institutions of the WTO were involved in the 
Declaration’s drafting and final adoption gives it the character of a subsequent 
agreement.201 It has been suggested that subsequent agreements are also a 
reflection of the parties’ intent and can be employed in interpreting the actual 
terms of the treaty.202 
 
3.3.2 The Declaration as evidence of subsequent practice establishing 
the understanding regarding the interpretation of the TRIPS 
Agreement 
The general rule of interpretation in the Vienna Convention requires that 
“subsequent practice” be taken into account together with the context when 
interpreting the provisions of any treaty.203  
                                                                                                                                                    
Art IX (2) of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization provides that 
“the Ministerial Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt 
interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.” 
198 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 280. 
199 Article 31(3) (a) stipulates that ‘there shall be taken into account together with the context; any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions’.  
200 Article IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization stipulates 
that “there shall be a Ministerial Conference composed of the representatives of all the 
Members…which shall have the authority to take decisions on all matters under any of the 
Multilateral Trade Agreements”. 
201 Gathii (fn 95) 301. 
202 Gathii (fn 95) 300. 
203 Article 31 (3) (b) provides that “there shall be taken into account together with the context any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation. 
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Consensus or common understanding between Members of the WTO, manifested 
by their conduct, can, therefore, provide important guidelines on the interpretation 
and implementation of the words of the TRIPS Agreement.204   
 
In Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages  wherein the Appellate Body, although 
reversing the panel’s finding that adopted GATT and WTO panel  reports constitute 
subsequent practice under article 31(3) (b), found however that such reports create 
“legitimate expectation” which should be taken into account where they are 
relevant to a dispute.205 In yet another dispute in United States- Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products the Appellate Body made use 
of the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Declaration for purposes of interpretation.206 It 
has been suggested that this signifies the readiness to refer to Declarations.207 
 
3.4 The 30 August Decision 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration instructed the Council for TRIPS to find “an 
expeditious solution” to the problem confronting WTO Members without 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities.208 The Council for TRIPS was also 
required to “report to the General Council before the end of 2002”, which deadline 
was missed. Almost two years after the adoption of the Doha Declaration, on 30 
August 2003, the WTO’s General Council adopted the Decision on Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health.209  
                                                 
204 Gathii, (fn 95) 310. 
Other decisions and policies adopted by Members may amount to subsequent practice under the 
TRIPS Agreement. For instance, the US with drew its complaints against the governments of Brazil 
South Africa (discussed in Chapter 2).  
205WT/DS8/AB/R, it should be noted however that WTO panel or appellate body reports are only 
binding upon the parties with respect to resolving the dispute between the parties concerned.  
206 WT/DS58/AB/R. 
207 Gervais (36) 398. 
208 Paragraph 6 stipulates thus “we recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use 
of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an 
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.” 
209  WT/L/540 Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (30 August 2003) 
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It is important to note that the aim of the Decision was not to address the issue 
whether or not countries can issue compulsory licences, as compulsory licences 
have been a feature of the international patent practically since its inception.210 
Rather, the issue addressed by the Decision is the extent to which drugs could be 
made available to countries lacking manufacturing capacity.211 
 
The Decision not only waived the article 31(f) requirement but article 31(h) as well 
which ordinarily requires that adequate remuneration be paid to the patentee.212 
Aside from these waivers of these all the other pre-conditions in article 31 continue 
to apply to licenses granted under the Decision. 
 
3.4.1 The article 31(f) hurdle 
The Decision seeks to alleviate the problems posed by article 31(f) which confront 
countries devoid of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Article 31(f) stipulates 
that licenses should be granted “predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market” of the Member issuing the licenses. Thus under this provision a country 
with manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector can grant a compulsory 
licence for its local production and supply all its internal needs but can only 
sanction the export of a “non predominant” part of the production.213 
 
As such some countries cannot effectively grant licences when these countries 
themselves lack production capacity in the pharmaceutical sector, and also where 
the drug is patented in potential exporting countries and exports from these 
                                                 
210 Reichman and Hasenzahi, “Non-voluntary licensing of patented inventions: Historical 
perspectives, legal framework under TRIPS and an overview of the practice in Canada and the USA” 
10 (2003) UNCTAD-ICTSD Issue Paper No. 5. 
211 Abbott(fn 51) 326. 
212 Article 31 (h) further stipulates that “the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the 
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization.” 
213  However article 31(k) stipulates that the provisions in article 31(f) shall not apply where the 
compulsory license is authorized to remedy anti competitive practices.                 
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countries under compulsory licenses.214 Thus article 31(f) not only restricts would 
be importers but potential exporters as well. 
 
Article 31(f) by restricting the availability of export drugs manufactured under 
compulsory licence, limits countries without manufacturing capabilities under 
licence in the availability of generics. The requirement that production must be 
predominantly for domestic consumption restrains the flexibility of Members to 
authorize for export under compulsory licence and thereby take advantage of 
economies of scale.215 
 
Article 31(f) creates a hurdle in the demand and supply of generic drugs in that if a 
developing Member lacks manufacturing capacity for a particular drug and there is 
no Member to supply it by export under licence, there may be no affordable drug 
available.216 
 
3.5 The new compulsory licence 
The 30 August Decision creates a new type of a compulsory licence whereby 
pharmaceutical products can be manufactured entirely for export. It is meant to 
alleviate the problems of those countries without manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
 
3.5.1 Product scope 
Paragraph defines what a “pharmaceutical products” is, to which the Decision shall 
apply.217  The reference to the Doha Declaration means that the scope is not limited 
to particular products. 
 
3.5.2 Eligibility of Members 
                                                 
214  Abbott (fn 51) 320. 
215 Abbott (fn 55)  17. 
216 Abbott( fn 55) 18. 
217 Paragraph 1 defines a pharmaceutical product as “any patented product, or product 
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public 
health as recognized in paragraph 1 of the Declaration.” 
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An “eligible importing Member” is defined to mean “any least developed Member 
and any other Member that has made a sufficient notification to the Council for 
TRIPS to use the system as an importer” either in a whole a limited manner.218 The 
Decision stipulates that it is understood among Members that this notification does 
not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the system. An exporting is 
defined as a Member using the system to produce pharmaceutical products for 
export to an eligible importing Member. An Annex to the Decision provides for the 
assessment as to whether an eligible importing Member has sufficient 
manufacturing capacity.219  
 
3.5.3 Article 31(f) waiver 
Paragraph 2(a) waives the requirement in article 31(f) on an exporting Member if 
the compulsory granted by it is to produce the pharmaceutical product for export 
to an eligible importing Member, with attached conditions.220 This notification 
procedure has been severely criticized as a deterrent on potential importers who 
may not want their identity to be revealed for fear of being subjected to political 
pressure from industrialized countries.221  
 
                                                 
218 Examples of a limited manner are: in cases of national emergency or other circumstances of 
emergency or in cases of public non-commercial use. 
Some Members indicated that they will not use the system as importers while others stated that if 
they use the system it will only be in situations of national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme emergency. 
219 The Annex stipulates that least-developed country Members are deemed to have insufficient 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. For other eligible Members insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity may be established in two ways. Firstly the Member has established that it 
has no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. Secondly where the Member has some 
manufacturing capacity in this sector it examines this capacity and finds that, excluding any 
capacity owned or controlled by the patent owner, it is currently insufficient to meet its needs. 
However the Annex further provides that once such capacity has since become sufficient to satisfy 
the Member needs, the system shall no longer apply. Therefore Members are at liberty in 
determining whether or not they have manufacturing capacity. 
220 The conditions are that the eligible importing Member has made notification to the TRIPS 
Council, which notification specifies the names and expected quantities of the products needed, 
confirms that the eligible Member in question (other than a least developed country) has 
established its insufficient or no manufacturing capacities as laid out in the Annex, and confirms 
that where a product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory 
licence in accordance with article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement as well as the Decision. 
221Hoen, “The Global politics of pharmaceutical monopoly power: drug patents, access, innovation 
and the application of the WTO Declaration on TRIPS AND Public Health” (2009) 37. Available 
online at  http://www.msfaccess.org/main/access-patents/the-global-politics-of-pharmaceutical-
monopoly-power-by-ellen-t-hoen/  (accessed on 10/03/09). 
 
 
 
 
 54
Paragraph 2(b) lays out the contents of the compulsory licence to be issued by the 
exporting Member. The licence must stipulate that only the amount of the product 
requested by the eligible importing Member shall be manufactured and that the 
entirety of this production shall be exported to the importing Member. Products 
destined for export shall be clearly identified as being for that purpose.222 This 
information regarding the transaction must be published on a publicly accessible 
website.223 
 
3.5.4 Article 31 (h) waiver 
Paragraph 3 waives the article 31(h) requiring payment of adequate remuneration 
to the paten holder. In terms of this paragraph the remuneration is paid in the 
exporting Member, while the relevant “economic value” of the product for 
determining the amount to be paid is the value of the use to the importing 
country.224 This waiver applies to both situations where an importing Member had 
to grant a compulsory licence owing to the existence of a patent and where there is 
no patent.225 
 
Potential importers are also required, by paragraph 4, to take reasonable measures 
proportional to their means and the level of risk to prevent diversion of the 
imported products.226 Paragraph requires Members to put into place effective legal 
mechanisms (already provided in the TRIPS Agreement) to curb the importation 
into their territories products manufactured under the system in order to avoid 
trade diversion. 
 
3.5.5 Regional grouping flexibility 
                                                 
222 Such identification can be through special packaging, colouring and shaping provided that such 
distinction is feasible and does not have a significant price effect. 
223 The WTO in its website has dedicated a page specifically for notifications and pertinent 
concerning the usage of the Decision 
224 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 269. 
225 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 269. 
226 Paragraph 3 also provides that in the event that “an eligible importing Member is a developing or 
least developed Member and experiences in implementing this provision , developed Members shall 
render, upon request and mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and financial to facilitate 
implementation”.  
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Paragraph 6 contains a waiver of article 31(f) for LDCs and developing countries in 
regional trade  configurations, allowing re-exportation of the products without 
additional export licensing, with a view to harnessing economies of scale for the 
purposes enhancing purchasing and facilitating the local production of 
pharmaceutical products.227 This waiver is said to have been particularly for 
African regional groupings to make easy the use of compulsory licences.228 
 
3.5.6 Technology transfer and annual review 
Paragraph 7 recognizes the need for technology transfer and capacity building for 
countries lacking or with insufficient capacity and to that end encourages exporting 
Members to use the Decision such that this objective is realised. 
 
Paragraph 8 requires that the TRIPS Council undertakes an annual review of the 
Decision and present an annual report to the General Council to ensure the 
Decisions effective operation pursuant to article IX (4) of the Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the WTO.229   
 
3.6 The legal status of the Decision 
A waiver does not involve any change in the substantive treaty obligations; it is 
only a temporary suspension of the treaty’s provisions.230 A WTO waiver means 
                                                 
227 Paragraph 6 provides that “where a developing or least developed country is a member to a 
regional group where at least half of the group’s membership comprises of those countries listed as 
LDCs by the United Nations, the article 31(f) requirement shall be waived to the extent necessary to 
enable a pharmaceutical produced or imported under a compulsory licence in that Member to be 
exported to the market of those other developing countries and LDCs parties to the regional 
configuration that share the health problem in question”.  
228 Hestermeyer (fn 53 ) 268. 
229 Article IX(4)  requires that “a decision by the Ministerial Conference granting a waiver shall state 
the exceptional circumstances justifying the decision, the terms and conditions governing the 
application of the waiver and the date on which the waiver shall terminate. Any waiver granted for a 
period of more than one year shall be reviewed by the Ministerial Conference not later than one 
year after it is granted, and thereafter annually until the waiver terminates. In each review the 
Ministerial Conference shall examine whether the exceptional circumstances justifying the waiver 
still exist and whether the terms and conditions attached to the waiver have been met. The 
Ministerial Conference, on the basis of the annual review, may extend, modify or terminate the 
waiver”.   
230 Correa, “Implementation of the WTO General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health” (2004)  5 World Health Organisation 
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that a Member shall not challenge any measures taken by another Member 
provided that the measures are in conformity with the provisions of the waiver.231 
The use of the other flexibilities envisaged by the TRIPS Agreement is also not 
affected by the Decision.232 The Decision as well as the waivers on article 31(f) and 
(h) shall terminate for each Member on the date upon which the Agreement’s 
amendment takes effect upon that Member. To that end the TRIPS Council had 
been tasked to initiate work on the preparation for such an amendment.233 
Article 57 of the Vienna Convention also deals with the issue of waivers by 
providing that a waiver may be suspended in conformity with the treaty’s 
provisions or by consent of all parties.234 
 
3.7 The Chairperson’s Statement 
The adoption of the Decision was accompanied by a complementary statement 
from the General Council Chairperson designed to allay fears held by other 
                                                                                                                                                    
Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy Available online at  
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Js6159e/2.html#Js6159e.2 (accessed on 11/04/09). 
231 Paragraph 10 of the Decision provides that “Members shall not challenge any measures taken in 
conformity with the provisions of the waivers contained in this Decision under subparagraphs 1(b) 
and 1(c) of article XXIII of the GATT 1994. Subparagraphs 1(b) and (c) require that “If any 
contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this 
Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is 
being impeded as the result of either the application by another contracting party of any measure, 
whether or not it conflicts  with the provisions of this Agreement or the existence of any such 
situation, the contracting  party may with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make 
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it considers to 
be concerned.” This means that Members may not make use of the “nullification and impairment” 
provisions laid of in article XXIII of the GATT in order to challenge actions taken in conformity with 
the 30 August Decision. 
232 Paragraph 9 of the Decision stipulates thus “this Decision is without prejudice to the rights, 
obligations and flexibilities that Members have under the provisions of the TRIPS Agreement other 
than paragraphs (f) and (h) of article 31, including those reaffirmed by the Declaration, and to their 
interpretation. It is also without prejudice to the extent to which pharmaceutical products produced 
under a compulsory licence can be exported under the present provisions of article 31(f) of the 
TRIPS Agreement.” 
233 Paragraph 11 provides that the “Decision , including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for 
each Member on the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions 
takes effect for that Member” 
234 Article 57 stipulates that “the operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular 
party may be suspended in conformity with the provisions of the treaty or at any time by the 
consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting states.”  
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Members as to the possible abuse of the Decision and the undermining patent 
protection.235  
 
In the Statement the Chairperson made it clear that although it was limited to the 
Paragraph 6 Decision, it represented key shared understandings among Members 
regarding the Decision to be taken and the manner of interpreting and 
implementing it. The Statement also encouraged Members to implement it in good 
faith to protect public health and not to be used to achieve industrial or commercial 
gains. Attached to the Statement was a compilation of “best practices” guidelines 
containing illustrations on procedures that could possibly be used to prevent 
diversion of products manufactured and exported under the Decision and to that 
end the Chairperson encouraged Members to draw upon these guidelines. 
     
The legal status of the Statement has been the subject of debate with various 
questions being asked regarding its interpretation and status.236 To that end it has 
been suggested that the only connection between the Statement and the Decision is 
the Decision’s drafting history.237 
 
3.8 Criticism levelled against the Decision 
Members welcomed the Decision with enthusiasm. Brazil, India and South Africa 
conceded that it would contribute in making medications more accessible to 
Members lacking manufacturing capacity while the representative of the Africa 
Group, Morocco applauding it as (a historic moment).238 Even the WTO’s 
leadership applauded it as evidence that “the organization can handle 
humanitarian as well as trade concerns”.239  
 
                                                 
235 The General Council Chairperson’s Statement. Available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm  (accessed on 
11.04/09). 
236 Gervais (fn 36) 400. 
237 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 285. 
238 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 271. 
239 Decision removes final patent obstacle to drug imports. Available online at  
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm  (accessed 11/04/09) 
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In some quarters the argument was that system would not be workable owing to its 
intricate legal and institutional requirements would render it ineffective, while 
others argued that time would put it to the test and urged all stakeholders to make 
concerted efforts to make it work.240  
 
The Decision has been termed a “procedural morass” in that it is elaborate, 
involves the procedural complexity of double licensing under article 31 with the 
result that it shrinks the market, increases the cost and is therefore neither a 
simple nor a sufficient solution.241 It has also been referred to as “a textbook 
example of a WTO compromise with little practical use”.242  
  
With regard to the Declaration, it re-affirmed the flexibility that Members have in 
addressing issues of access to essential medicines. The fundamental tenet of the 
Declaration is that the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted in a way 
supportive of Members’ right to protect public health. Therefore it is a 
commendable step in ensuring that IP do not take precedence over Members’ right 
to protect public health. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
240 Hestermeyer (fn 53)  271. 
241 Baker, “Arthritic flexibilities for accessing medicines: Analysis of WTO action regarding 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health” (2004) Indian 
International and Comparative Law Review 15. 
242 Hoen (fn 221) 38. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HAS DOHA DELIVERED ON ITS MANDATE OF ACCESS TO 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD?  
The preceding chapter has discussed both the Doha Declaration as well as the 30 
August Decision. The defects sighted in the Decision mainly had to do with the 
complex administrative procedure involved in making use of the Decision. The 
present chapter seeks to address the main question on whether the Doha 
Declaration has in fact translated into access to essential medicines for all, with 
emphasis on both developing countries and LDCs.   
 
This chapter focuses on the amendments to Canada’s Patents Act which 
incorporated the 30 August Decision. Canada is the first WTO Member to enact the 
provisions of the article 31(f) waiver into its domestic legislation in order to allow 
“eligible Members” to import generic versions of patented drugs.243 The 
amendment has also only been used once by Rwanda. The aim of discussing 
Canada’s Patents Act is to prove whether or not the 30 August Decision is indeed 
defective. 
 
Although the Decision has only been once, it has been argued in some quarters that 
the accomplishments of the Decision should not be solely judged based on the 
incidence of its use because the mere fact that the mechanism is in place has 
affirmative secondary effects.244 Indeed it has been argued that its existence, which 
                                                 
243 Other countries which have incorporated the Decision include China- State Intellectual Property 
Office Order N. 37 (effective as of 1 January 2006) Norway-Policy rules on issuing compulsory 
licences pursuant to WTO Decision WT/L/540 on the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, under section 57(1) of the United Kingdom 
Act on Patents of 1995. 
 India-Section 49 of the Patents Amendment Bill  No. 92 of 2003. 
 European Union Regulation (EC) No 816/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 May 2006 on compulsory licensing of patents relating to the manufacture of pharmaceutical 
products for export to countries with public health problems. 
244 Palmedo, “How reporters covered the 6 December 2005 WTO deal that amended the TRIPS 
Agreement on the topic of export of generic medicines manufactured under a compulsory licence”. 
Available online at    http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/wtoreporting-table.html (accessed on 
14/03/09). 
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poses the threat of compulsory licences, gives developing countries some leverage 
when negotiating for licences.245    
Case studies of other countries such as Brazil, India, Malawi and Thailand are also 
considered and a determination is made as whether these flexibilities actually 
improved access to essential medicines where used. The reactions that the use of 
these flexibilities drew from the pharmaceutical industry and other WTO Members 
are considered as well in a bid to establish whether the pre-Doha attitudes are still 
at play.   
4.1 Canada-the first country to implement the Decision 
In September 2003 Canada became the first country to publicly declare its 
intention to implement and incorporate the 30 August Decision into its domestic 
law. Bill C-9 is commonly referred to as the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa 
(JCPA)246. The JCPA authorizes the granting of “for export only” compulsory 
licences to Canadian generic pharmaceutical companies to supply countries lacking 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity with lower cost versions of pharmaceutical 
products patented in Canada. 
4.1.2 The initial draft  
On 6 November 2003, after intense lobbying the federal government of Canada 
introduced a draft bill (Bill C-9) in the House of Commons, just a day prior to the 
closing of the parliamentary session.247The Bill received Royal Assent in May 2004 
and exactly one year later, in May 2005 the amendments to the Canada’s Patent 
Act came into force.248 
                                                 
245 Mmeta, “Amendment to TRIPS Agreement: consensus or dissension?”  (2006) Tralac Trade 
brief( No. 5 )8. 
246 The Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa  named after Canada’s Liberal Prime Minister during whose 
tenure the bill was first introduced in November 2003(in full An Act to amend the Patent Act and 
the Food and Drugs Act). Bill C-9 which was introduced in the House of Commons on 12 February 
to amend Canada’s Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act. The JCPA  has come to be commonly 
known by the Canadian government as the Canadian Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR).                       
247 Elliot, “Pledges and pitfalls: Canada’s legislation on compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals for 
export” (2006) 1 International Journal of Intellectual Property Management 96. 
248 Patent Act, R.S.C, 1985, c. P-4. 
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Although the objectives of BillC-9 gained widespread exhortation from the public, 
non-governmental organizations and the pharmaceutical industry, a number of 
civil society bodies had highlighted flaws within the proposed amendment that 
could ultimately weaken these objectives.249These concerns were “the right of first 
refusal”, the duration of the compulsory licence, the exclusion of NGOs from 
directly procuring drugs directly from the generic manufacturers, the limited list of 
drugs eligible for manufacture and export , the eligibility criteria for would-be 
importers as well as the regulatory review that would be brought about by 
amendments to the Food and Drugs Act.250   
The “right to first refusal” was criticized as making Bill C-9 a TRIPS -plus law in 
that actually amounted to a “third right of refusal”.251  This provision which had 
been described by the pharmaceutical industry as “equal opportunity to supply” to 
the country needing the drugs, was conversely classified by NGOs as an “early 
opportunity to block competition” as it would deter generic manufacturers from 
using it.252  
4.1.3 The final Act 
Facing pressure from activists the government of Canada removed the “right to 
first refusal” thereby avoiding setting a negative “TRIPS-plus” precedent for the 
                                                 
249 These concerns were highlighted in a letter dated 26 March 2004 addressed to the Standing 
Committee on Industry, Science and Technology.  Available at 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=1046 (accessed on 
13/04/09).  
250 See fn 249. 
251 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, “Global access to medicines: will Canada meet the 
challenge?”  A submission to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology 
regarding Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, Canadian HIV/ 
AIDS Legal Network, (26 February 2004) 14. Available online at 
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/publicationsdocEN.php?ref=693 (accessed on 10/04/09).      
252  Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network,  “Global access to medicines: will Canada meet the 
challenge?, A supplementary submission to the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology regarding Bill C-9, An Act to amend the Patent Act and the Food and Drugs Act, 
Canadian HIV/ AIDS Legal Network, (8 March 2004). Available online at  
http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/publicationsdocEN.php?ref=695     (accessed on 10/04/09).      
 Thus not only undermining countries’ ability to effectively make use of compulsory licensing, but 
also contradicted the letter and spirit of the Doha Declaration.   
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implementation of the August 30 Decision.253 NGOs welcomed this decision and 
called upon the Government and Committee to resolve other outstanding issues 
before finally passing the bill into law.254  
Soon after the coming into force of the Amendment, Stephen Lewis, then UN 
Special Envoy on HIV-AIDS in Africa applauded its enactment and urged Canada’s 
government to take full advantage of it.255 Conversely it was disparaged by the 
originator pharmaceutical industry.256 
The Food and Drugs Act was also amended to apply to the products manufactured 
for export under CAMR’s provisions. Section 37 provides that its requirements do 
not apply to any drug or device that is not manufactured for consumption in 
Canada, provided the package is marked as being for “export” and a certificate has 
been issued stating that the package together with the contents thereof is not in 
breach of any known requirement of the law of the importing country.257 
Regardless of this long-standing practice, the Food and Drugs Act was amended to 
ensure that its regulations become applicable to pharmaceuticals that are produced 
for export pursuant to the WTO’s 30 August Decision. On 1 June 2005 the 
                                                 
253 Elliot(fn 247) 44. 
254 Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, MSF Canada, Canadian  Council for International 
Cooperation, and Oxfam Canada, Media Release: Latest amendments to Canada Patent Act a good 
start, but still need work” Available on line at www.aidslaw.ca/gtag (accessed on 10/04/09). 
255 Abbott, “Introductory note to World Trade Organization Canada first notice to manufacture 
generic drug for export” (2007) 46 International Legal Materials 1127. Available online at   
http://www.frederickabbott.com/uploads/Abbott-_ILM_Note_as_Published.pdf  (accessed on 
12/04/09).  
256  Abbott (fn 255) 1127. 
Harvey Bale, the Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufactures 
Association (IFPMA) was quoted as publicly saying that the initiative by the Canadian government 
would be “a negative black eye” for Canada that would in all likelihood affect the investment 
climate.  
257 Section 37(1) of the Food and Drugs Act (R.S.,1985, C, F-27) provides that the Act “does not 
apply to any packaged food, drug, cosmetic or device not manufactured for consumption in Canada 
and not sold for consumption in Canada, if the package is marked in distinct overprinting with the 
word “export” or “exportation” and the certificate that the package and its contents do not 
contravene any known requirement of the law of the country to which it is or about to be consigned. 
Section 37 (2) which is the amendment stipulates that despite the provisions in subsection (1) the 
Act shall apply “in respect of a drug or device to be manufactured for the purpose of being exported 
in accordance with the General Council Decision, as though it were drug or device  to be 
manufactured and sold for consumption in Canada, unless the regulations provide otherwise.” 
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accompanying regulations entered into force upon publication in the Canada 
Gazette.258 
 
In light of the fact that the 30 August Decision itself is burdensome it is only to be 
expected that the Patent Act provisions should be unwieldy.259 The Act contains 19 
sections and above 100 clauses and sub-clauses. To understand this piece of 
legislation is quite a task as it requires legal training and support.260  
The amendment to Canada’s Patents Act which came into force in May 2005 
incorporated the provisions of Bill c-9 by introducing new sections, namely 
sections 21.01 to 21.17 after the existing section 21. This would allow the granting of 
compulsory licences to Canadian pharmaceutical companies allowing them to 
manufacture within Canada, specified, patented pharmaceutical products for 
export to certain developing and least developed countries.  
The amendment contains four clauses, the first clause adds a new heading “Use of 
patents for international humanitarian purposes to address public health 
problems”, under which the additions to sections 21.01 -21.17 fall. Section 21.01 
succinctly identifies the primary purpose of the new sections as being “to facilitate 
access to pharmaceutical products to address public health problems afflicting 
many developing and least- developed countries,  especially those resulting from 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”.  
Section 21.02 deals with definition of terms including the terms “patented product” 
and “pharmaceutical product”, these with resonate the definitions in the 3o August 
Decision. Section 21.03 establishes four Schedules to the Act and provides for their 
amendment by Cabinet. Schedule 1 lists the patented products that could be used 
                                                 
258 These regulations were in three sets namely : Use of patented products for international 
humanitarian purposes regulations, S.O.R./2005- 143 ; Food and Drug Regulations (1402 drugs for 
developing countries), S.O.R./ 2005- 142; Medical devices regulations (developing countries), 
S.O.R./ 2005- 142                
259 The deficiencies of the 30 August Decision have been highlighted in Chapter 3. 
260  “Neither expeditious, nor a solution: the WTO august 30th decision is unworkable”- An 
illustration through Canada’s Jean Chrétien pledge to Africa (prepared for the XVI International 
AIDS Conference, Toronto, August 2006   Available on-line at www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/wtoaugustreport.pdf (accessed on 13/04.08).         
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to address public health problems under the Act. The list currently includes 
products on the WHO’s list of essential medicines that are currently under patent 
in Canada.261  
Section 21.04 provides for the prescribed form for compulsory licence applications 
to the Commissioner of Patents.262  Section 21.05 authorizes the Commissioner to 
grant a compulsory licence provided all conditions have been satisfied. Section 
21.06 deals with the format of the compulsory licence. Disclosure of prescribed 
information on a website is dealt with in section 21.07. Section 21.08 specifies that 
the licensee must pay a royalty to the patentee in the amount of two percent of the 
value of products exported under the compulsory licence. The duration of the 
compulsory licence shall be two years as stipulated in section 21.09.  
Sections 21.10-11 provide that use shall be non-exclusive and non-transferable; the 
patentee can continue to use the patent for commercial purposes during the term 
of the compulsory licence. The non-transferability shall be subject to article 31(e) of 
the TRIPS Agreement.263 Section 21.12 deals with renewals264, while sections 21.13-
14 provides for the licence’s termination.265  
                                                 
261 Schedules 2 to 4 list countries that would be eligible importers under the Act. Schedule 2 being 
LDCs regardless of the WTO membership status. Schedule 3 lists those WTO Members, mainly 
developing countries that have not notified the TRIPS Council that they will not use the scheme as 
importers. The 4th Schedule lists those WTO Members that have indicated they will use the system 
to import patented medicines only in public health emergency. Also in the 4th Schedule are 
developing countries that are not Members of the WTO but are on the Organisation of Economic 
Co-0peration and Development (OECD)’s list of eligible for official development assistance.  
Section 21.03(2) precludes the addition to Schedule 3 of any WTO Member country if that country 
has notified the TRIPS Council that it will import only in situations of emergency. 
Available on line at http://www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/countr-pays/elig-admis/countr-pays_e.html 
accessed on 15/04/09 
262 Section 21.04 stipulates that such applications must be brought to the attention of the patentee. 
The generics maker and the patentee must then negotiate a voluntary licence and if at the expiry of 
30 days no agreement has been reached regarding the possibility of a voluntary licence the 
Commissioner is obliged to grant a compulsory licence to the generics maker.   
263 Article 31(e) provides that the use of patents under compulsory licensing shall be non-assignable 
“except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which enjoys such use”. 
264 This section requires that  a licensee’s application for renewal to the Commissioner of Patents  
must certify that the quantity intended to have been exported was not exported before the licence’s 
expiration 
265 Section 21.12 stipulates that termination shall occur at the earliest of either the expiration of the 
two years, or on the day in which the Commissioner of Patents notifies the licensee that Minister of 
Health no longer believes that the product satisfies the requirements of the Food and Drugs Act and 
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Section 21.15 provides that the Commissioner of Patents must notify each patentee 
in writing of the granting of a compulsory license. The Advisory Committee which 
shall advice on products to be listed in Schedule 1 is provided for in section 21.16. 
Ministerial review is dealt with in the last section 21.17 which stipulates that the 
Minister of Industry shall be required to review section 21.01-16 and their 
applications three years after coming into force and report to the Parliament.   
4.4 Critique of Canada’s Patent Act 
The provisions of the Patent Act deserve a close analysis in order to determine how 
it has implemented the provisions of the WTO’s Decision of 30 August. Despite its 
commendable humanitarian goals it has been criticized for its lack of expediency in 
ensuring that medicines get to the intended beneficiaries, namely developing 
countries and LDCs.266 
These deficiencies that have been cited by academics and those concerned with 
issues of access to medicines is be discussed below. 
4.4.1 Limited list of products 
 Schedule 1 has also been a bone of contention as it specifies which pharmaceutical 
products would qualify for manufacture and exportation under the drug access 
scheme, and it has been suggested that this a double standard on developing 
countries lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.267 Currently the 
Schedule contains 56 pharmaceutical products that can be manufactured by a 
                                                                                                                                                    
its regulations, or on the day on which the last product provided under the compulsory licence is 
exported, or sixty days after the product or importing country is removed from the Schedule. 
266 Cohen-Kohler,’ Canada’s implementation of the Paragraph 6 Decision, is it sustainable public 
policy?’ (2007) 3 Globalization and Health 1. Available online at 
http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/pdf/1744-8603-3-12.pdf  (accessed on 21/04/09) 
267(fn 252) 12. 
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generic maker for export.268 Section 21.03(1) (a) requires that an order of the 
federal Cabinet be made before a product can be added to the list.269  
It has been suggested that the existence of this list is in contradiction with the 
provisions of the Doha Declaration in paragraph 1 which recognizes “the gravity of 
the public health problems” prevalent in developing countries and LDCs 
particularly those which are a consequence of “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics”.270 It is clear from this paragraph that the diseases 
mentioned do not by any means constitute an exhaustive list, because the diseases 
covered by the Doha Declaration are not limited to the ones mentioned; rather 
those mentioned were only used primarily for illustrative purposes. It would also 
follow naturally, therefore, that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the 
medicines to be exported under Canada’s amended Patent Act. 
It also impinges on developing countries’ sovereignty as independent decision-
makers in their domestic affairs to determine for themselves the pharmaceutical 
products that they will need in the public health context.271 It is the law of the 
importing country which informs the decision whether a particular generic drug 
can imported into that country and Canada, if it is to fully implement the waiver, 
should not be instructing a potential importing country on what medicines should 
be or not be imported.272 
It is neither practical no desirable to predict the pharmaceutical medicines needs of 
Members make efforts   to protect their public health by promoting access to 
                                                 
268 List of medicines in Schedule 1 available online at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/P-
4/sc:1//en#anchorsc:1 accessed on 15/04/09 
269 Section21.03 (1)(a)(i) requires “the Governor in Council may, by order, on the recommendation 
of the Minister or the Minister of Health, amend Schedule 1 by adding the name of any patented 
product that may be used to address public health  afflicting developing countries. Subsection (ii) 
further provides that the Governor may also remove “an entry listed in Schedule 1”acting on the 
recommendations made by the Minister or the Minister of Health. 
270 (fn 252) 12. 
271 (fn 251)  18. 
272 (fn 251) 18. 
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medicines for all.273 This is further reiterated by the Doha Declaration in Paragraph 
5 (b).274 The WHO, in a statement released soon after the WTO’s waiver, affirmed 
that “the agreement covers all medicines” and that “countries will need to review 
the full range of medicines required”. 275 
The pharmaceutical industry has also been instrumental in ensuring that a limited 
list was drawn by exerting pressure upon government to ensure that some crucial 
medicines did not make it into the list.276 
A question which begs an answer is what criteria was used in compiling the list in 
Schedule 1. Canada’s government had modeled the list in Schedule 1 using the 
WHO’S Model List277 which activists pointed out that the WHO’s Model List was 
simply a “model”, intended for use by countries in coming up with their own 
national lists of essential medicines taking into account their needs and should not 
have been followed religiously.278  
Developing countries have been quoted as saying that some of the medicines on the 
list are not relevant to their needs, rather they would prefer to see included in the 
list second and third line ARV therapy before CAMR can be said to be addressing 
their needs.279 
One might say that the Canadian government is concerned about the possibility of 
the system being abused by importing countries. However, imposing this list in 
                                                 
273 “Canada and the Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public health”, Public health address at seminar hosted by the North-South 
Institute,  21 October 2003 available online at www.aidslaw.ca        
274 This provision unequivocally states that “each Member has the right to grant compulsory 
licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”. 
275 Statement of the World Health Organization on WTO access to medicines Decision ( 1 September  
2003).      
276Elliot (fn 247) 101. 
In this case the pharmaceutical company Bayer that holds the Canadian patent on the moxifloxacin 
drug reportedly made telephone calls to  Canada’s opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) 
objecting to this drug’s inclusion in the Bill C-9. Subsequent to pressure from the industry motions 
to add specific drugs to the list were also withdrawn, products which all parties had been in 
consensus to add to the list. 
277 See fn 3. 
278 See fn 251, 19. 
279 Cohen-Kohler (fn 266) 3. 
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anticipation of abuse of the system is premature in the absence of any hint that the 
exploitation has occurred.280  
Since the enactment of the amendment the Schedule 1 list, there have been two 
pharmaceutical products added to the list at the urging of generic makers and 
NGOs. In September 2005 a request was made by generic manufacturer Apotex to 
add a fixed-dose combination of AIDS drug.281 A second addition was also made a 
year later in September 2006, for the anti-influenza drug oseltamivir which cures 
avian flu.282  
The period of time taken to add a single drug and bureaucratic process involved 
reflects poorly on having a list in the first place. As such the system would have 
functioned better if developing countries themselves were allowed to decide which 
drugs are needed at a particular point in time to deal with public health problems. 
4.4.2 Exclusion of NGOs from obtaining generic pharmaceuticals for 
patients through the system                
The significance of the efforts by UN agencies and NGOs in getting medicines to 
patients cannot be overemphasized.283 These organizations are active in providing 
humanitarian relief in the delivery of health care services in developing countries 
have to procure medication to carry out their tasks. Their exclusion from procuring 
drugs under Canada’s legislation is therefore unsettling as it would directly have 
negative repercussions for patients in developing countries.  
In terms of section 21.o4 (2) (f) of the Act, in order to get a licence to provide 
medicines, a Canadian generic producer must file an application embodying 
particular details with “the government” of that country or “agent of that 
government” . A measure of liberty allowing these NGOs to contract directly with a 
                                                 
280 (fn 251) 20. 
281 Order Amending Schedule 1 of the Patent Act, SOR/2005-276 August 31, 2005, C Gaz 2005, 11, 
2145     
282 Order Amending Schedule 1 of the Patent Act, SOR/2006-204, September 21 2006, C Gaz, 2006, 
11, 1308         
283 (fn 251)  23. 
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Canadian generic manufacturer to acquire the drugs needed, without having to 
first enter into some kind of “agency” agreement envisaged by section 21.04(2) (f) 
with a government would be ideal in order for NGOs to continue fulfilling their 
mandate of delivering health to patients who cannot afford the drugs but are in 
need them.284  
4.4.3 Regulatory review of pharmaceutical products manufactured for 
the purposes of exportation  
As already mentioned previously the Patent Act together with the Food and Drugs 
Act were amended in order to implement the WTO’s waiver of article 31(f). 
Canadian does not generally require that drugs destined exclusively for export to 
meet the same regulatory standards as required for domestic consumption drugs. 
However section 37(2) of the Food and Drugs was amended to the effect that drugs 
for export have to comply with these standards.285  
This is an entirely commendable step as it seeks to ensure that drugs destined for 
exportation are of the same quality, safety and efficacy standards as drugs for 
domestic consumption.286 However given the bureaucracy involved in adding a 
product onto the list, the process might be time consuming. An expeditious process 
is therefore required particularly in light of the immense need of drugs in the 
developing world. Applying the same regulatory standards to both domestic 
export-destined drugs will inevitably disrupt the supply of much-needed 
medication to developing countries. A level of flexibility will therefore be required 
if the mechanism is to be “an expeditious” solution to get the generic medicines to 
the intended beneficiaries. 
 
                                                 
284 (fn 251) 23. 
285The Patent Act now stipulates that in order for the Commissioner of Patents to grant a 
compulsory licence for the manufacture of a generic there must be, inter alia, a notification from the 
Minister of Health the generic drug in question meets the demands of the Food and Drugs Act. 
286Elliot, “Delivering on the pledge: Global access to medicines, WTO rules, and reforming Canada’s 
law on compulsory licensing for export” McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development 
Law and Policy 50. 
 
 
 
 
 70
4.4.4 Eligible countries that qualify to use the system as importers 
The Patent Act specifies that all LDCs are eligible to participate as importers 
regardless of their WTO Membership status and these countries are listed in 
Schedule 2. However Schedule 3 which lists developing countries gives different 
treatment as Membership to the WTO is a prerequisite for them to procure drugs 
from Canadian generic manufacturers. This restriction does not reflect well the 
letter and spirit of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, which in paragraph 4 makes reference to “promote access to medicines for 
all”. Differentiating between WTO and non-WTO Members is evidence of double 
standard as the Patent Act further requires that a non WTO Member must, inter 
alia, “declare a national emergency or situation of extreme urgency” which has 
been deemed unnecessary by the Doha Declaration.287 
4.4.5 The two year term of the compulsory licence 
The two years set as the maximum duration of the compulsory licence is 
disconcerting, particularly when taken together with the requirement that the 
licence will only be for a specified quantity as set out in the agreement between a 
generic producer and the purchaser for the eligible importing country. At the 
expiry of the stipulated two years, the generic maker will have to embark the whole 
process anew in the event that the manufacturer seeks to produce more of the 
generics. This process will again be for one product, one licence and for two years. 
Continued production of a generic under the compulsory licence after the two years 
is in contravention of the Patent Act’s provisions and could initiate expensive 
litigation. It has been suggested that a longer term for the compulsory licences 
under the system can be motivation for generic makers to enter into supply 
contracts with importing countries.288  
It is submitted that the two year term might have negative consequences as some 
health problems such as HIV/ AIDS require long term measures as they cannot be 
                                                 
287 Elliot (fn 286) 52. 
288 Elliot (fn 286) 54.     
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possibly dealt within a short space of two years. The two year term also has 
negative impact even on the importing countries as their public health initiatives 
may be put on stand-by while a new compulsory licence is being negotiated. This 
might see patients in these countries having to go without treatment during that 
period and this might have dire consequences to their lives especially for 
HIV/AIDS patients who require continuous medication and a break in treatment 
may result in resistance to treatment when it is resumed.  
Canada’s Patent Act has also been criticised as being far removed from the realities 
of developing countries and the pharmaceutical industry.289  This criticism is based 
on the reasoning that, not only does it lack commercial incentives for the generic 
manufacturers it also lacks the incentive for developing countries and LDCs to use 
it when they can import the drugs they need at lower cost from countries such as 
India.290 
 
Moreover some officials from developing countries have lamented the lack of input 
into CAMR’s legislative process by developing countries and LDCs, after all these 
countries are the intended beneficiaries as such some level of input from them 
would have gone a long way in alleviating their health problems.291 
 
4.5 The first use of the Act’s provisions 
The provisions of Canada’s Patent Act have only been used once by Rwanda as the 
importing country and Apotex the generic maker. In the following discussion the 
practical implementation of the Act’s substantive provisions is given attention. 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
289 Cohen-Kohler (fn 266) 1. 
290 ibid Cohen-Kohler (fn 266) 1. 
291 ibid Cohen-Kohler (fn 266) 3. 
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4.5.1 Medecins Sans Frontires’s willingness to test the Act 
In May 2004, the same month in which the amendments were passed as law, 
Medecins Sans Frontires (MSF)292 made a public commitment to test the 
expediency and efficacy of the amendments by placing an order for drugs needed 
for its field operations. In August 2004 a meeting was held between Health Canada 
(Canada’s federal Health Department), the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical 
Association (CGPA), MSF was requested to identify which drugs were extremely 
needed as a matter of urgency.293 Finally in December 2004, Apotex Inc, a 
Canadian privately owned company agreed to produce a triple-combination 
antiretroviral combination for HIV/ AIDS.  
  
 4.5.2 Apotex- the generic manufacturer  
The generic manufacturer Apotex then developed the Tri- Avir drug, (a fixed-dose 
combination). After that, Apotex had to contend with the problem that the drug 
was not on the list of products in Schedule 1. This necessitated an application to the 
federal Cabinet for the addition of the newly developed generic drug. In September 
2005, the Cabinet made the requisite order amending the Schedule of the Patent 
Act.294  In the same year Apotex submitted to Health Canada an application for 
approval, and the review process took approximately seven months.295   
 
The next and most arduous task was the long-drawn-out process of negotiations 
engaged between Apotex and the patent-holding companies.296 Apotex then 
engaged in negotiations with the patent holders as required by Canadian Patent 
                                                 
292 MSF has been one of the most prominent NGOs  in the field of access to medicines in the poorest 
parts of the world. It has also been in the forefront in debates relating to access to medicines  versus 
patent protection   
293 fn 260.         
294  fn 281.  
295 Hestermeyer, “Canadian-made drugs for Rwanda: the first application of the WTO waiver on 
patents and medicines.” (2007) 11 ASIL Insight International Economic Law Edition. Available 
online at  http://www.asil.org/search.cfm?displayPage=363  (accessed 20.04/09) 
296 Hestermeyer (fn 295). 
Nine patents are related to the FDC developed by Apotex. Four of the patents are held by 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), two by Wellcome Foundation, two by Shire Biochem and one by 
Boehringer Ingelheim. 
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Act, however progress was minimal reportedly because the patent holders could 
attach any condition to prevent an agreement.297  
 
Apotex also could not satisfy one of the conditions for applying for a compulsory 
licence, namely that there was no importing country. Canada’s Patent Act requires, 
in section 21.04, that the importer be identified, inter alia, before a compulsory 
licence can be issued. This reluctance has be attributed to the intense criticism that 
Brazil and Thailand received from the pharmaceutical industry as well as other 
governments when these two countries issued compulsory licences on patented 
drugs for domestic health programmes.298 
 
4.5.3 Rwanda-the importing country 
On July 19, 2007, as required by paragraph 2 (a) of the 30 August Decision, 
Rwanda became the first country to notify the TRIPS Council indicating that it 
wished to use the waiver to import a fixed-dose, triple combination HIV/AIDS drug 
manufactured by the Canadian generic pharmaceutical manufacturer Apotex.299  
 
In this notification Rwanda informed the TRIPS Council that based on its 
evaluation of its public health needs, it would import during the next two years 
260, 000 packs of the fixed-dose combination TriAvir, manufactured by Apotex. A 
unique feature of the notification is that it specifies that since it was not possible to 
give a certain prediction the extent of Rwanda’s public health needs, the country 
reserved the right to modify their estimate specified in the notice as necessary or 
appropriate.300  
                                                 
297 Hestermeyer (fn 295).  
298 “Brazil issues compulsory licence for AIDS drug”, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest , Vol 11, 
Number 16, 9 May 2007. Available online at www.ictsd.net/news/bridges/11643/ (accessed on 
11/04/09). 
299 IP/N/9/RWA/1 Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual of Intellectual Property Rights- 
Notification under Paragraph 2(a) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement, dated 19/07/07. Available online at 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_import_e.htm  accessed on 
12/04/09. 
300 The relevant excerpt of the Notification states “However, because it is not possible to predict 
with certainty the extent of the country’s public health needs, we reserve the right to modify the 
foregoing estimate as necessary or appropriate.” 
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It is difficult to imagine how Rwanda proposed to “modify their estimate specified 
in the notice as necessary” because if such a modification exceeded what was 
specified in Apotex’s compulsory licence then it would mean a new compulsory 
licence which would have to go through the same cumbersome process. It must be 
noted that a renewal of the licence can only be granted where the drug specified 
has not been manufactured or exported in its entirety. 
 
The notice also specified that pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration 
Rwanda would not enforce rights provided for in Part II Section 5 of the TRIPS 
Agreement that may be granted within Rwanda’s territory with respect to the 
drug(s) intended to be imported. 301  This particular point important because if a 
patent exists for the drug intended for importation, the importing country is 
supposed to also issue a compulsory licence. However since LDCs are excluded 
from the obligation to grant patent protection as stipulated by the 2002 Decision 
extending their transition period then the requirement of also issuing a compulsory 
licence also falls away, provided of course the LDC has not granted a patent for that 
product. 302 
 
Noteworthy is the fact that Rwanda could have wholly avoided using the 30 August 
mechanism because the same combination that it sought to import from Canada 
was also available at comparable cost from India where the three drug components 
are not under patent protection.303  
 
 
 
                                                 
301 Paragraph 7 is a reaffirmation of developed-country Members commitment to provide incentives 
to their enterprises and institutions so as to encourage technology transfer to LDCs pursuant of 
article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement. In terms of this paragraph LDCs are not required, with regard 
to pharmaceutical products, to enforce sections 5 and 7 of Part II of the TRIPS Agreement until 1 
January 2016. 
302 Fn 75. 
303 Hestermeyer (fn 295). 
A similar combination is available in India at a cheaper price of US$0.14 per tablet, while Apotex 
sold it for US$0.40 per tablet  
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4.5.4 The issuing of the first compulsory licence 
On 4 September 2007 Apotex filed the first compulsory licence under the system to 
the Canada’s Commissioner of Patents which was granted on 19 September 2007 
pursuant to section 21.04 of the Patent Act.304  
 
In terms of this “authorization”305 the quantity of the pharmaceutical product to be 
manufactured was specified as 15, 600, 000 tablets. This authorization also 
specified that it would be in force for a period of two years from the date it was 
granted on 19 September 2007. This means that the compulsory licence will expire 
in September 2009.  
 
After the authorization was granted Canada notified the WTO’s TRIPS Council in 
October 2007 pursuant to paragraph 2(c) of the 30 August Decision which requires 
such notification from Members intending to use the system as exporters.306 The 
authorization was also attached to the notification. 
 
In September 2008 the first consignment of the ARV drugs for HIV/AIDS arrived 
in Rwanda after a four- year processand. As a result an estimated 21, 000 
Rwandans living with AIDS would be able to receive treatment for a year.307   
 
4.6 Lessons taken from Canada’s Patent Act 
While Canada’s Patent Act has noble intentions aimed at enabling countries 
lacking pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to access medicines, Rwanda’s 
scenario has demonstrated beyond any doubt that implementing the decision is not 
an easy task. 
                                                 
304 Gervais (fn 36) 68. 
305 Authorization under section 21.04 of the Patent Act. Available online at  
http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/RCAM_autorisations-
CAMR_authorizations-eng.pdf/$file/RCAM_autorisations-CAMR_authorizations-eng.pdf  
(accessed 13/04/09).  
306  IP/N/10/CAN/1 Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights-Notification 
under paragraph 2(c ) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of paragraph 6 of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, dated 08/ 10/07.  Available 
online at   http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_notif_export_e.htm   
accessed on 12/04/09.             
307 fn 23. 
 
 
 
 
 76
 
After discussing all the controversies that CAMR’s enactment and implementation 
has courted, a pivotal question that has to be asked is whether these defects render 
it an ineffective process in the bid to ensure access to essential medicines in the 
developing world.308 It has been suggested that the difficulties experienced by 
Apotex may well be ordinary “start inefficiencies”, however it must be remembered 
that most of these problems were predicted and highlighted by NGOs and the 
generic makers through out the legislative.309 
 
The fact that a G-7 country took the step to enact such legislation is noteworthy as 
it generates needed political impetus from a developed country behind the 
implementation of the Decision.310 
 
The amendment confirms the fears that have been raised by public health 
advocates, regarding the effectiveness of the 30 August Decision. The Rwanda and 
Canada is a clear indication that the decision is “neither a solution, nor 
expedient”.311 Although the drug was finally delivered with the 21 000 patients 
benefiting, the process of merely securing the drug was arduous and complicated 
and simply confirms the criticism levelled against the 30 August Decsion. 
 
With regard to the requirement that Canada’s Patent Act first requires negotiations 
for a voluntary licence it must be remembered that the TRIPS Agreement in article 
31(b) waives this requirement of prior negotiations. On this point Canada has 
steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the 30 August Decision allows the waiver 
of prior negotiations.312  
 
                                                 
308 Abbott (fn 255) 1127. 
309 Abbott (fn 255) 1127. 
310 “Steps forward, backward and sideways: Canada’s bill on exporting generic pharmaceuticals”. 
Available online at http://www.aidslaw.ca/publications/interfaces/downloadFile.php?ref=327 
(accessed on 15/04/09). 
311 Fn 260. 
312Abbot (fn 255) 1127. 
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As to the requirement that the generic maker must first identify an importing 
country prior to applying for authorization, public health officials from developing 
countries, NGOs and generic makers have also highlighted the inefficiency of this 
requirement.313 They pointed out that the bulk of government pharmaceutical 
purchasing is done from public tendering processes, such that the identification of 
an importing country prior to applying for a compulsory licence is incompatible 
with customary practices. 314 
 
The pitfalls highlighted must be taken note of namely, the limited list of medicines 
that can be manufactured for export , the fact that developing countries who are 
non-WTO Members  cannot make use of the mechanism is a flaw as it 
distinguishes LDCs and developing countries and not conferring the same 
treatment in public health issues.  
 
The provisions excluding NGOs from making use of the Patent Act to procure 
medication for patients in the developing world is a regrettable feature in the Act as 
these organisations play a crucial role in getting treatment to those in need. Their 
exclusion will hamper their efforts in this regard and the patients are the ones who 
will inevitably bear the brunt of this provision. Another cause of concern is the 
duration of a compulsory licence granted in terms of the amendment already 
discussed. It has been shown how cumbersome the process is just to get a licence, 
moreover after the end of the period if the medical crisis still exists a new 
application process will have to be embarked upon.  
 
However the amendment is not without its redeeming features as it sets a positive 
precedent in defining licensing negotiations and also defining royalties. The Act 
brought with it some clarity on the vague notion of “reasonable remuneration”. In 
article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement under normal circumstances the party that 
wishes to obtain a compulsory licence must first make attempts to obtain such 
authorization voluntarily from the patent holder “on reasonable terms and 
                                                 
313Abbott (fn 255)  1128. 
314Abbott (fn 255)  1128. 
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conditions”, it is only after such attempts have foundered “within a reasonable 
period of time” can be granted.315  
 
 The Act brings clarity as to what constitutes “a reasonable period of time” for 
attempting to negotiate a voluntary licence by proving that the Commissioner of 
Patents “shall” issue a compulsory licence provided that , in addition to  satisfying 
the other statutory requirements,  the applicant has 30 days prior filing the 
application provided the patent holder the information required by statute and that 
the applicant’s  efforts in obtaining a voluntary licence “on reasonable terms and 
conditions” have not been met with success. The stipulation of the 30 day period is 
indeed a positive precedent.316  
 
However must be remembered that the TRIPS Agreement in article 31(b) waives 
this requirement of prior negotiations. On this point Canada has steadfastly 
refused to acknowledge that the 30 August Decision allows the waiver of prior 
negotiations.317  
 
On the same strength the statute also brought clarity as to amounts to “adequate 
remuneration” payable to the patentee upon the granting of a compulsory licence 
as required by the TRIPS Agreement. The Act now provides that the calculation of 
the royalty in any given case would be guided by a formula set out in the 
complementary regulations.318 The Commissioner therefore has no discretionary 
powers when granting a compulsory licence neither can the Commissioner vary the 
royalty payable. 
 
4.7 Review of the Patent Act 
Review of the Patent is provided for by the amendment in section 21.02 which 
requires that the Minister of Industry to complete a review of the provisions related 
                                                 
315 Elliot (fn 286) 44. 
316 Elliot (fn 247) 99. 
317  Abbot (fn 255) 1127. 
318 Use of patented products for international humanitarian purposes regulations, S.O.R 2005/143.    
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to Patent Act within two years of its entry into force. A report regarding the review 
of the new sections of the Patent was made in May 2007.319  
 
The process of reviewing the statute took “into account all” submissions made by 
the industry as well as NGOs involved in the field of delivering medication in 
developing countries.  The reported concluded with the finding that “insufficient 
time” had elapsed and “insufficient evidence” had accumulated since the coming 
into force of the amendment to necessitate legislative changes. The report went on 
further to state that government of Canada should rather focus on “non-legislative 
measures to improve access to medicines in the developing world, until a more 
sufficient assessment could be made”. These “non-legislative” measures include a 
federal budget for 2007 which introduced a tax incentive to encourage 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to donate greater amounts of needed medication to 
developing countries and LDCs.320  
 
4.8 Use of other flexibilities in the Post Doha era  
The Doha Declaration re-affirmed all the other flexibilities in the TRIPS 
Agreement. This chapter discusses the implementation of the flexibilities as 
clarified in the Doha Declaration. Examples of countries which made use of the 
flexibilities are also included in order to understand how the countries went about 
implementing the flexibilities. 
 
From 2001 to the end of 2007 it has seen 52 developing countries and LDCs 
issuing post-Doha compulsory licences for the production or importation of 
generic forms of patented drugs, government–use provisions have also been used 
as well as the implementing the provisions on non-enforceable patents.321  
 
                                                 
319   Report on the Statutory Review of sections 21.01- 21.19 of the Patent Act by Jim Prentice, 
Minister of Industry. Available online at www.camr-rcam.gc.ca/review-
reviser/camr_rcam_report_rapport_e.html (accessed on 11 April 2009).   
320 Gervais (fn 36) 69. 
321 Hoen (fn 221) xvi.      
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Many countries also successfully made use of the flexibilities as leverage in price 
negotiations with pharmaceutical companies and an apt example in this regard is 
Brazil which has made numerous threats to issue compulsory licences and 
succeeded in getting significant price reductions.322  
 
4.9 The case of Brazil- a developing country 
In September 2003, Brazil’s government issued a pronouncement that would allow 
it to issue a compulsory licence produce or import generic versions of patented 
HIV/AIDS medication.323 Brazil’s Minister stated that this decision had been 
necessitated by the fact that the patent holder Merck had failed to offer adequate 
price reductions.324 Following this declaration of intention to issue a compulsory 
licence Brazil and Merck reached consensus later that year and a compulsory 
licence was averted.325  
 
In yet another incident in 2005 Brazil’s Health Minister issued a decree declaring 
the patent of the ARV Kaletra drug in the public interest and therefore eligible for 
compulsory licensing.326 Subsequently pharmaceutical company Abbott agreed to 
reduce the price of the drug by 46 percent and a compulsory licence was once again 
averted.327 
 
In the same year the government of Brazil declared that it was considering issuing 
a compulsory licence to authorize the manufacture of Viread, whose patent is held 
by pharmaceutical company Gilead.328 Threatened with a compulsory licence 
Gilead was out of options and agreed to reduce the price of the drug by 50 per 
cent.329  
 
                                                 
322 Shaffer et al (fn 64) 32. 
323 Love, “Recent examples of the use of compulsory licences on patent” (2007) Knowledge Ecology 
International Research Note 16. 
324Love (fn 323) 16. 
325Love (fn 323) 16. 
326 Love (fn 323) 16. 
327Love (fn 323) 16. 
328Love (fn 323) 16. 
329Love (fn 323) 16. 
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These threats by the Brazilian to issue compulsory licences and not actually issuing 
one led to a campaign dubbing the government of Brazil a “tiger without teeth” in 
September 2005 organized by a national gathering of non-governmental 
organizations working on HIV/ AIDS in Brazil. 330 
 
However it is submitted that even though Brazil’s government did not actually 
proceed to issue the threatened compulsory licences in the above instances it 
should be noted that the desired result of reducing the prices was achieved. 
Pharmaceutical companies in these cases when faced with prospects of compulsory 
licences being issued had little choice but to reduce prices. As such the significant 
power that compulsory licences wield in ensuring access to medicines is significant 
even when they are actually not issued.  
 
On 24 April 2007 Brazil’s Minister of Health signed Ministerial Ordinance 866 
declaring the HIV/AIDS efavirenz drug to be of public interest for purposes of 
granting a compulsory licence for public non-commercial use.331  
 
This decision was taken after a number of failed attempts initiated by the Brazilian 
government to negotiate an agreement with the patent holder multinational 
pharmaceutical company Merck Sharpe and Dome (MSD-hereinafter Merck).332  
 
It is noteworthy that the TRIPS Agreement in article 31(b) waives the requirement 
to engage in negotiations before issuing a compulsory licence for public non-
commercial use . Therefore the Brazilian government’s efforts to reach a mutually 
agreed solution with Merck was actually not required and could probably be 
described as a show of good faith on the part of the government. 
                                                 
330 Hoen, (fn 221) 45. 
331 Brazilian government declares efavirenz to be of public interest (24 April, 2007) Available online 
at  
http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/LUMISE77B47C8ITEMIDD3ED04F71D8D46819F52E948F99
783B3ENIE.htm (accessed on 10/05/09). 
332Balasubramanian, Brazil moves on compulsory licence after failed talks with drug company (May 
2007). Available online at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo050703.htm  
(accessed on 10/05/09 ).  
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The Ministerial Ordinance stated that its ultimate purpose was to ensure the 
survival of its National Sexually Transmitted Diseases and AIDS Programme.333 In 
the Ordinance Brazil relied on its domestic legislation as well as the Doha 
Declaration. Brazil also made it clear that it had engaged in negotiations with 
Merck which were unsuccessful, that the drug was pivotal in implementing the 
above mentioned Programme, that due to the steady increase in the number of 
people infected with HIV/AIDS and the current prices of the drug, the situation 
was untenable.334   
 
This time Brazil issued a compulsory licence. After Merck failed to match the 60 
per cent price reduction sought by Brazil (Merck had offered a maximum of 30 per 
cent) the government issued a compulsory licence in May 2007 for the efavirenz 
drug.335  
 
In a further development in September 2008, after extensive investigations Brazil’s 
National Institute Industrial Property rejected a patent application by 
pharmaceutical company Gilead.336 The application’s rejection was based on lack of 
inventiveness as it did not represent an invention because its major ingredient was 
already present in other drugs pharmaceutical agents.337   
                                                 
333  Ministerial Ordinance of 24 April 2007. Available online at  
http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/LUMISE77B47C8ITEMIDD3ED04F71D8D46819F52E948F99
783B3ENIE.htm (accessed on10/05/09). 
334At that time the drug was being sold in Brazil for approximately US$580 per patient per year 
(PPY), while generic versions that have been pre-qualified by the WHO had been offered for 
US$163 PPY. It was estimated that 75,000 patients would be using the drug at the end of that year 
and despite the increasing number of people using the drug had not gone down. Projections were 
made which estimated that the government would make saving in expenditure amounting to 
US$236 million. Available online at  
http://www.aids.gov.br/data/Pages/LUMISE77B47C8ITEMIDD3ED04F71D8D46819F52E948F99
783B3ENIE.htm accessed on10/05/09).  
335 Alcorn, Brazil issue a compulsory licence on efavirenz (7 May 2007). Available online at 
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/0550CE62-3F90-4603-932C-EF69E1B4485D.asp  (accessed 
on 10/05/09). 
Merck’s spokesperson was reported as warning that actions such as Brazil were going to dissuade 
pharmaceutical companies from investing into research and development into diseases affecting 
developing countries. 
336Alcorn, Brazil rejects tenofovir patent (05 September 2008). Available online at 
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/945B0134-C898-40D0-9DC6-9C765352E158.asp (accessed 
10/05/09). 
337 fn 336.  
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4.10 The case of Thailand 
In 2007 Thailand captured international attention after it had issued a series of 
compulsory licences on patented drugs, with little prior negotiations or warnings at 
a royalty of 0.5 percent of the sale price – considerably lower than the market price 
sold by the patent holders.338 
 
Thailand has a national mandate to supply access to essential medicines to all its 
citizens pursuant to the National Health Security Act of 2002 and access to ARVs 
for all AIDS patients since 2003.339 
 
4.10.1 The effavirenz compulsory licence 
On November 2006, Thailand issued a compulsory licence to its Government 
Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) on Merck’s patented drug efavirenz (an 
effective and expensive first line treatment for AIDS which has fewer side effects 
and is also on Thailand‘s National List of ARVs).340 In issuing the compulsory 
licence Thailand relied on its domestic law341 as well as the Doha Declaration.  
 
Article 51 of the Thai Patent Act provides that for the public use ministries, bureaus 
or departments may exploit any patent without further negotiation with the patent 
holder. In the Announcement Thailand went on to elaborate that this made it clear 
that for non-commercial use, especially in public affairs of the government such as 
public health services, the Government was well within its rights. Thailand also 
stated that the Doha Declaration allows Members to put in place measures to 
                                                 
338 Ho (2008), “On breaking patents: Separating strands of fact from fiction under TRIPS” The 
selected works of Cynthia M Ho, 28. Available online at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=cynthia_ho (accessed on 
14/04/09). 
339 Thai National Health Security Act B.E. 2245. 
340 Announcement of the Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, Thailand on the 
public use of patent pharmaceutical products  (29 November 2006). Available online at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thaicl4efavirenz.html accessed on21/04/09  
341 Specifically article 51 of the Thai Patent Act B.E 2522 (as amended by the Thai Patent Act 2535 
and no. 3 B.E 252). 
The licence also stated that it was for non-commercial purposes and solely for public interest in 
order to achieve its policy of universal access for Thai citizens in need for long-term use of ARVs. 
Furthermore the licence also pointed out that the high cost of the drug in the absence of the 
compulsory licence would result in numerous patients not being able to access treatment. The 
licence was set to benefit 200, 000 patients each year.  
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protect public health, especially for universal access to essential medicines using 
compulsory licensing on the patents of pharmaceutical products. In addition the 
Announcement also stipulated that Department of Disease Control will notify the 
patent holder and Department of Intellectual Property, Ministry of Commerce with 
immediate effect. 
 
The licence which will be valid until 31 December 2011 authorizes Thailand’s 
Government Pharmaceutical Organization to import generic efavirenz from India 
where drug is not patented and to manufacture the drug itself. A royalty fee of 0.5 
percent of the GPO’s total value of the imported or locally produced efavirenz will 
be payable to the patent holder Merck.   
 
Merck objected to the granting of the compulsory licence on grounds it was not 
TRIPS compliant as there were no prior negotiations and considered selling the 
drug at lower prices or negotiating a voluntary licence for the manufacture of the 
drug generic version.342 Merck offered to reduce the price by more than half its 
market price343 
  
It is submitted that Merck’s contention is an error because Thailand’s licence is 
fully TRIPS-compliant. First of all article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement provides 
that the requirement for prior negotiations may be waived by a Member in cases of 
public non-commercial use, and to that end Thailand licence stated that it was 
indeed for public non-commercial use, therefore the need for prior negotiations 
was waived. Article 31(b) further requires that in cases of public non-commercial 
use the right holder shall nevertheless be notified of the compulsory licence as soon 
as reasonably practicable. It is further submitted that this particular requirement 
                                                 
342  Steinbrook, “Thailand and the compulsory licensing of efavirenz” (2007) 356 The New England 
Journal of Medicine 546. Available online at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/356/6/544  
(accessed on 21/04/09). 
343“Timeline for Thailand’s compulsory licences” Programme for Information, Justice and 
Intellectual Property (2 March 2008) 5. Available online at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/timeline.pdf?rd=1  accessed on 17/04/09 
Notably the brand-name drug Efavirenz sold at close to 1, 400 baht per bottle (Thailand currency) 
while India’s generics producer Ranbaxy sold the generic version for 650 baht per bottle. 
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was fulfilled because the Announcement clearly stipulated that the patent owner 
would be notified with immediate effect. 
 
4.10.2 The Kaletra licence 
The Thailand government issued yet another compulsory licence, on 25 January 
2007, for AIDS drug Kaletra whose patent is owned by Abbott.344 This particular 
licence was also crafted to augment an increased number of patients and 
consequently save lives. 
 
In essence the Kaletra licence replicated the provisions of the Efavirenz licence, 
regarding Thailand’s reliance on its national patent legislation as well as the Doha 
Declaration, the 0.5 per cent royalty, and notification of the patent owner with 
immediate effect. The Decree stated that the compulsory licence would be valid 
until 31  January 2012. 
 
Abbott opposed the Kaletra licence in response withdrew it applications to sell 
seven new drugs in Thailand.345 The pharmaceutical heavily criticized Thailand’s 
actions and was quoted accusing Thailand of “stealing and seizing patents”, that 
“there was no emergency” as well as “taking advantage of the vague language in the 
WTO regulations”.346  
 
It is submitted that once again the industry is in error. Regarding the issue of 
emergency the Doha Declaration unequivocally states in Paragraph 5(c) that each 
Member is at liberty to determine what constitutes national emergency, it being 
understood that public health crises, including to HIV/ AIDS, among others, can 
                                                 
344 Decree of the Department of Disease Control, Ministry of Public Health, regarding exploitation 
of patent on drugs and medical supplies by the government on combination drug between Lopinavir 
and Ritonavir (29  January 2007).  Kaletra is a patented combination of two ARVs often used for 
patients who have developed resistance to basic formulations of HIV therapy.  
The licence was set to benefit Thailand’s 250, 000 patients per year. Available online at  
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-kaletra_en.pdf  (accessed on 18/04/09). 
345 “Abbot to stop launching new drugs in Thailand in response to country’s compulsory licence for 
antiretroviral Kaletra” Kaiser Daily News HIV/AIDS Report (14 March 2007). Available online at 
http://www.hivdent.org/_uspublicpolicy_/Archives/2007/ppATSL0307.htm (accessed on 
18/04/09). 
346 fn 345 
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represent a national emergency. Therefore Thailand was well within its rights to 
classify the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a national emergency.  
 
The contention that Thailand was “taking advantage of the vague language in the 
WTO language” is once again a misconception, it is submitted that there is nothing 
“vague” about the TRIPS Agreement or Doha Declaration. Rather this is the very 
flexibility built into the TRIPS Agreement, the room for countries to manoeuvre 
and exercise discretion in issues of public health, which Thailand exercised and 
rightly so in order to ensure access to essential medicines. 
  
All in all it is once again submitted that the Kaletra is with the TRIPS Agreement as 
well as the Doha Declaration. 
 
4.10.3 The Plavix licence  
On the same day as the Kaletra licence was issued, the Thai government also issued 
another compulsory licence to the GPO for Bristol Myer’s drug Plavix, useful for 
treating heart ailments.347 The licence made mention of the fact that heart disease 
is one of the top three causes of deaths in Thailand, and even though there existed 
some non-drug measures, there is need for drug treatment to curb unwarranted 
deaths.348  
 
The Plavix licence also replicates the provisions of the two earlier compulsory 
licences regarding the reliance on article 51 of the Thai Patent Act, the Doha 
Declaration, the 0, 5 percent remuneration as well the expedient notification of the 
patent owner Bristol Myer. However the unique feature of this licence is that it 
                                                 
347Ministry of Public Health Announcement regarding exploitation of patents on drugs and medical 
supplies for Clopidogrel ( 29 January 2007). Available online at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-clopidogrel_en.pdf (accessed on 18/04/09). 
348Such other non-drug preventive measures include diet control as well as mental and physical 
exercise, but these would be inadequate as the incidents are high and need medicines for treatment 
to avoid morbidity and mortality. The Thai government also clarified that without this licence only 
20% of government patients could access the medicine, which would be inconsistent with the Thai 
policy of universal access. The licence also stipulated that it would cover all patients suffering from 
the cardiovascular ailment covered under the National Health Security Act, the Social Security Act, 
and the Civil Servants and Employees Medical Benefit Scheme. 
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does not have a specific date on which it will expire, rather the licence provides that 
it shall be valid until the patent expires or when the “essential need” ceases.349  
 
4.10.4 Thailand’s “Ten burning facts about Thailand” White Paper 
In February 2007, subsequent to the issuance of the three compulsory licences 
Thailand issued a white paper entitled ‘Ten burning facts about Thailand”, 
including supporting documentation defending its three licences,350 wherein the 
Thai government went to lengths to explain its health needs, explaining that the 
rational of its actions was based on its policy to ensure universal access to essential 
medicines, that its licences were indeed TRIPS–compliant. In defending its stance 
for not engaging in prior negotiation the Thai government asserted that issuing 
compulsory licences without prior negotiations is generally more effective and 
successful.  
 
4.10.5 Reactions drawn by the compulsory licences 
The pharmaceutical industry was quoted criticizing Thailand on grounds that 
conditions such as heart disease and cancer are “lifestyle” diseases that should not 
be the subject of compulsory licences.351 
 
Conversely humanitarian organizations, such as the Nobel-winning MSF, were 
quoted applauding Thailand’s actions in making use of this flexibility.352 In 
December 2007 the UN’s Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was also quoted 
                                                 
349 The licence provides that “ the use of the above patent rights is effective from today until the 
patent expires or no essential need”. 
350 “Facts and evidence on the 10 burning issues related to the government use of patents if three 
patented essential drugs in Thailand-Document to support strengthening of social wisdom on the 
issue of drug patents”, The Ministry of Public Health and the National Health Security Office, 
Thailand , February 2007. Available online at 
http://www.moph.go.th/hot/White%20Paper%20CL-EN.pdf (accessed on 14/04/09). 
351Wong, “Thailand backs off threat to break drug patents”  (8 February) Available online at 
http://www.scidev.net/en/news/thailand-backs-off-threat-to-break-drug-patents.html (accessed 
on 14/04/09). 
352 fn 39. 
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applauding Thailand’s efforts in addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis and singling out 
compulsory licences as pivotal in ensuring equitable access to medicines.353  
 
It is noteworthy that Abbott’s unilateral action to withdraw its applications for the 
seven new drugs in Thailand was actually regarded as constituting anti-competitive 
conduct in some quarters.354 It is submitted that if Thailand’s Competition 
Commission had actually confirmed this claim the consequences would have been 
dire for Abbott as Thailand would legitimately issue compulsory licences for these 
drugs. 
 
4.10.6 The Special 301 Watch List 
Due to these compulsory licences Thailand was “elevated” to the USA’s Special 301 
Watch list.355 In a 2007 Special 301 Report reasons given for the inclusion of 
Thailand in the List ranged from “indications of a weakening of respect of patents” 
to “lack of transparency and due process” in the issuance of the three compulsory 
licences and thus justifying a serious concern to the USA’s Administration.356  
                                                 
353 “Timeline for Thailand’s compulsory licences” Programme for Information, Justice and 
Intellectual Property (2 March 2008) 13. Available online at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/documents/timeline.pdf?rd=1  accessed on 17/04/09 
In July 2007, the EU, in a letter through its Trade Commissioner was also reported as having 
castigated Thailand for its seemingly unbridled use of compulsory licensing. The EU latter denied 
this claim in a March 2008 statement wherein it affirmed that Thailand’s actions were indeed 
WTO-complaint. Switzerland was also reported as also having written a letter to the Thai 
government condemning it for issuing the compulsory licences in February 2008.    
354 (fn 353) 13. 
HIV/AIDS activists viewed Abbott’s actions as constituting anti-competitive practice and brought 
the matter before Thailand’s Competition Commission. However the Commission rejected these 
claims. The issue of anti-competitive practices is dealt with by the TRIPS Agreement in article 31(k) 
which actually permits the granting of a compulsory licence to remedy anti-competitive practices 
after a judicial or administrative process has determined that anti-competitive conduct has indeed 
taken place.   
355 Love, “KEI Statement on USTR 301 List reference to Thailand”. Available online at 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2007-April/011055.html (accessed on 18/04/09). 
356 2007 Special 301 Report Office of the United States Trade Representative. Available online at  
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2007/2007_Special_301_
Review/asset_upload_file230_11122.pdf  (accessed on 18/04/09). 
In the report the USTR cited Thailand’s intellectual property rights protection as being deficient  
and that Thailand’s compulsory licences was indicative of a weakening of respect for patents. The 
report stated that the USA was seriously concerned about the lack of transparency and due process 
exhibited in Thailand supposedly exhibited by the three compulsory licences. The Report further 
stated that it was dedicated to addressing the serious the serious health problems, such as 
HIV/AIDS afflicting developing and least developed countries alike. The Report went on to state 
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It is submitted that the USA’s reiteration of its commitment to the Doha 
Declaration leaves a lot to be desired, it appears as if it simply pays lip service to 
the Doha Declaration while its actions and that of the pharmaceutical industry 
contradict these statements.  
 
With reference to the USA’s claim that Thailand’s actions “lack transparency and 
due process”, it has been suggested rather that what lacks transparency is the very 
arbitrary and political process for creating the 301 List and that the question of the 
“due process” of the List is questionable.357 
 
The USA itself has made extensive use of compulsory licensing ranging from the 
licence for the anthrax drug Cipro whose patent was held by Bayer, to compulsory 
licences to benefit Toyota and Microsoft, to mention but a few, that had absolutely 
nothing to do with public health.358 As such the reaction by the USA displays 
double standards. 
 
4.10.7 Thailand makes use of the patentability criteria 
In 2006 Thailand’s Health and Development Foundation filed a legal challenge 
against GlaxoSmith-Kline (GSK)’S application for a patent on an ARV FDC. The 
Foundation’s argument was that the drug did not satisfy the “newness” 
requirement stipulated by article 27(1) of the TRIPS Agreement and that the 
combination of two known drugs neither of which was patented in Thailand could 
not be considered sufficiently inventive to deserve a patent. 359 
                                                                                                                                                    
that the USA was firmly of the view that the TRIPS Agreement sufficient flexibility to address public 
health problems and also affirmed its support of the Doha Declaration. 
357 Fn 355.  
358 Love, “Racist and ignorant reactions to Thailand’s compulsory” Huffington Post (25 January 
2007). Available online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/racist-and-ignorant-
react_b_39618.html  (accessed on 08/03/09). 
359 Ford et al, “Sustaining access to antiretroviral therapy in developing countries: Lessons from 
Brazil and Thailand”.(2007)  Medecins sans Frontieres Publications . Available online at  
http://www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/user_upload/diseases/hiv-
aids/Sustaining%20access%20to%20ARV%20_lessons%20from%20Brazil%20and%20Thailand.p
df (accessed on 15/04/09). 
 
 
 
 
 90
4.11 The case of the developing world’s pharmacy-India  
India has earned the reputation as being the “developing world’s pharmacy” as it is 
the major supplier essential medicines to developing countries, not only for 
HIV/AIDS medicines, but other medicines as well, with 67% of India’s generic 
medicines being exported to developing countries.360 Unlike other developing 
countries India took advantage of the 10 year transition period by developing and 
maintaining a world-class generics production capacity, it this attribute that has 
enabled Indian manufacturers to drive down prices for key ARV treatment.361  
The consequences of introducing patent protection in India with the lapsing of the 
grace period in 2005 are two-fold.362 Firstly, newly developed drugs after 1 January 
2005 will be subject matter for patenting.363  For example in the area of ARVs for 
the treatment of HIV/AIDS, where drug resistance develops, if new drugs are 
developed to address drug resistance, cheaper generic versions of these new drugs 
will not be available because of patent protection unless India or another country 
issues a compulsory licence.364 
Secondly, after the 2005 deadline, India had to process patent applications 
submitted under the “mail box” mechanism since 1 January 1995 , with the result 
that drugs falling within the mailbox provision will be patented (provided they 
                                                 
360 “Examples of the importance of India as the “pharmacy of the developing world”,  (2007) 
Medecines sans Frontieres Publications. Available online at  
http://www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/user_upload/medinnov_accesspatents/Overview%20Jan%2
02007%20FINAL.pdf (accessed on 15/04/09). 
India is the primary source of affordable ARVs as it is one of the few countries with the capacity to 
producer theses newer medicines as generics; as such all AIDS programmes use India as their main 
source of products. Approximately 50% of essential medicines that UNICEF distributes in 
developing countries are sourced from India. Zimbabwe sources 90% of its ARVs for its national 
treatment programmes from India. Not only does it export finished products, India also exports raw 
materials to other countries such as Brazil for local production of low-cost medicines. 
361 Abbott and Reichman (fn 39) 934. 
362 Abbott (fn 51) 321. 
363 Abbot (fn 51) 321. 
364Abbott (fn 51) 321. 
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satisfy India’s patentability criteria) for the remainder of the twenty- year term 
from the date of filing of their mailbox application.365 
4.11.1 Amendments to India’s Patent Act 
India’s Patent Act of 1970 has undergone three amendments between 1995 and 
2005, while its pharmaceutical industry is a force to be reckoned within the global 
pharmaceutical sector.366 
Some of the important provisions in the Amendment of 2005 include a new 
meaning to the term “new invention”,367 restrictions the scope for patentability,368 
“bolar exception”,369  as well parallel importation.370  
                                                 
365Abbott (fn 51) 321. 
India’s patent regime did not, until 2005, recognize patents for pharmaceutical products and this 
had enabled Indian generic companies to manufacture generic versions of patented drugs including 
HIV/ AIDS treatment and this earned the reputation of being dubbed the “developing world’s 
pharmacy”. However December 31 2004 marked the developing countries end of their transition 
period as they had to comply fully with all of the TRIPS Agreement’s provisions, patents included, 
as of 1 January 2005 
366 Sharma, “New patent regime in India- challenges and the future of the pharmaceutical industry” 
(2007) 4.  
India’s pharmaceutical sector is currently ranked 4th and 13th in terms of volume and value, 
respectively, in the global pharmaceutical business. The first amendment in 1999 served to 
incorporate the “mailbox provision” to provide an avenue by which patents could be filed with effect 
from 1 January 1995. The purpose of the second amendment in 2002 was to bring the Act into 
conformity with the TRIPS Agreement by incorporating all of the Agreement’s substantive provision 
including the extension of the patent term to 20 years, re-defining patentable subject matter as well 
as compulsory licensing. However provisions relating to product patents were excluded because the 
2005 deadline had not expired. In March 2005 India passed the Patent Bill No. 32-C to effect the 
third amendment signalling a new era in India’s patent regime. It adopted a definition of 
“pharmaceutical substance”, excluded “mere discovery of a new form known substance” and “new 
use of known substance” as well as protecting the interests of those who are already producing the 
product which may be granted patent protection.   
367 Section 2(1) defines a new invention as “any invention or technology which has not been 
anticipated by publication in any document or used in the country or anywhere else in the world 
before the date of filing of patent application with complete specification, i.e. the subject matter has 
not fallen in public domain or that it does not form part of the state of the art.” 
368 Section 3(d) excludes from patentability “the mere discovery of any form of a known substance 
which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere 
discovery of any new property or new use of a known substance or of the mere use of a known 
process, machine or apparatus unless such process results in a new product or employs at least one 
new reactant.”   
369Section 107 A (a) stipulates that “certain acts cannot be considered as infringement. For the 
purposes of this Act – (a) any act of making, constructing, using or selling a patented version solely 
for uses reasonably relating and development and submission of information required under any 
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A commendable feature of India’s new patent legislation requires that a “new 
invention” must not have been anticipated either through publication in any 
document or used in India or anywhere else in the world. In other words “absolute 
novelty” is required for new inventions. This form of novelty means that the 
invention is truly inventive in that it is universally new throughout the world.371 It 
is submitted that this will go a long way in addressing health issues in that only 
true medicinal drugs will be patented.  
 
Another commendable feature of India’s new patent legislation is the system of 
automatic licensing for a generic manufacturer who is already producing and 
marketing the medicine in India and has made a “significant investment”, 
permitting continued production regardless of a patent’s existence. The generic 
manufacturer is however required to pay a “reasonable royalty” to the patent-
holding company.372 
 
It is submitted that the 2005 Amendment is an exceptional example of how a 
country can fully incorporate the legitimate TRIPS flexibilities as envisaged by the 
Agreement.  
 
4.11.2 Norvatis sues India 
The provisions of section 3(d) were subjected to adjudication when in 2006 India’s 
High Court, for the first time ever, rejected a patent application brought by 
Norvatis (a Swiss based pharmaceutical company).373  
                                                                                                                                                    
law for the time being in force, in India, or in any country other than India that regulates the 
manufacture, the construction, use of any product.”  
370 Section 107 A (b) provides that “any importation of patented products by any person from a 
person, who is duly authorized by the patentee to sell or distribute the product, shall not be 
considered as an infringement of patent rights”. 
371 Correa, ‘A guide to pharmaceutical patents” (2008)  South Centre 2.  
372 The amended section 11 A(7) now provides that “after a patent is granted in respect of 
applications made under sub-section 2 of section 5, the patent holder shall only be entitled to 
receive reasonable royalty from such enterprises which have made significant investment and were 
producing and marketing the concerned product prior to the 1st day of January 2005, and which 
continues to manufacture the product covered by the patent on the date of grant of the patent and 
no infringement proceedings shall be instituted against such enterprises.”   
373 Capdevilla, India verdict welcomed by advocates for affordable medicines. Available online at   
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38805 (accessed on 11/04/09).  
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Prior to the matter being brought before the High Court, Norvatis had filed for a 
patent for its leukaemia drug Glivec (also known as Gleevec) and India’s patent 
office (the Controller General of Patents and Designs) had ruled that the drug was 
merely a new form of an existing treatment which was developed before 1995.374 
 
The amendment to section 3(d) of the Principal Act precluded from patentability 
any new form of a known drug which did not “result in the enhancement of the 
known efficacy” of that drug. Norvatis then brought the matter before the Court 
challenging the constitutionality of section 3(d), seeking an annulment of the said 
section, as well as seeking the Court to grant the patent.375 Norvatis’ arguments 
were based on grounds that section 3(d) violated articles 27(1) and 27(2) of the 
TRIPS Agreement as well as articles 253 and 51 (c) of India’s Constitution, and the 
arbitrariness by the Controller General in rejecting the patent application.376 The 
High Court of Chennai rejected Norvatis’ argument and declared that section 3(d) 
was indeed constitutional. The decision was applauded by advocates for affordable 
medicines as “having a positive impact on public health” and would propel the 
cause of promoting patients’ access to affordable essential medicines.377 This High 
                                                 
374 Norvatis AG v Union of India. In the High Court of Judicature at Madras (Special Jurisdiction) 
W.P. NO. 24759 of 2006. 
Six other respondents cited in the matter were: The Controller General of Patents and Designs, 
Natco Pharma Ltd, Cipla Ltd, Hetro Drugs Ltd, Cancer Patients Aid Association, and  Ranbaxy 
Laboratories Ltd. 
Available online at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/novartis-v-india.doc (accessed on 
11/04/09). 
375 Sharma (fn 366) 8. 
376 Sharma (fn 366) 9. 
Articles 253 and 51(c) of India’s Constitution require that India’s domestic laws be brought into line 
with international treaties. 
Article 253 provides that ”the Parliament has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the 
territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or 
countries or any decision made at any international conference, association and other body.” 
Article 51(c) stipulates that “the state shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and 
treaty obligations of organized peoples with one another.”  
In addition Norvatis also claimed that section 3(d)’s provision dealing with a “new form” was 
illogical and contrary to the concept of patents which is supposed to encourage creativity by 
rewarding persons associated with such acts which benefit the public.  
377 Bidwai, “Health India: Norvatis patents case far from dead”. Available online at 
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38840 (accessed on 11/04/09).  
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Court‘s judgement was also seen as a vindication of India’s Patents Act, particularly 
section 3(d).  
 
Contrary to the view held by the pharmaceutical industry that India’s patent laws 
would discourage innovation; the considered view is that India’s patent laws do not 
discourage research and inventiveness.378 Rather section 3(d) only precludes 
incremental innovation thereby promoting genuine ingenuity, and deservedly so.379 
 
The defeat of Norvatis had significant implications particularly in light of 
thousands of patent applications in India’s 1995-2005 “mailbox” which would have 
to be granted had Norvatis won the case.380   
 
The “ever greening” mechanism which has become quite prevalent effectively 
means that there is no originality but simply re-working an existing compound.381 
There is also evidence to suggest that while only a minimal number of new 
chemical compounds are approved annually, numerous patents are applied for to 
protect variants of existing products and processes.382  
4.12 The case of Malawi- a least developed country 
Malawi is included because it is a LDC and the WTO Decision of 2002 exempts all 
LDCs’ transition period has been extended until 2016 and as such they are 
exemped from implementing obligations regarding pharmaceutical patents.383 
 
                                                 
378 Sharma (fn 366) 10. 
379 Sharma (fn 366) 10. 
380 Baker, “2007 Victories: Fewer deaths and more compulsory licences”. Available online at 
http://www.healthgap.org/trips/2007victories.htm (accessed on 15/04/09). 
381 Kameni, “Implications of the Indian intellectual property law on Sub-Saharan Africa countries” 
(2008) 2 The Botswana Review of Ethics, Law and HIV/AIDS 65. 
382 Correa, “Guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents: developing a public health 
perspective” (2007) a ICTSD-UNCTAD-WHO Working paper, 1. Available online at 
http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/06/correa_patentability20guidelines.pdf  (accessed on 
12/04/09). 
383 Fn 75. 
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4.12.1 Malawi’s Patents Act 
Malawi’s Patents Act384 does not take full advantage of the key flexibilities, such as 
parallel importation, under the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration or the 30 
August Decision although it does have some potential flexibilities built in.385 
Malawi’s entire patent regime could best be described as TRIPS-plus because it 
prematurely grants patent protection for medicines, this is illustrated by a 
provision which mandates extension of patents for periods ranging between 5 and 
10 years which can be granted on grounds of hostility or inadequate 
“remuneration”.386  
4.12.2 Malawi’s roll-out programme of ARV therapy 
As already alluded to, most LDCs have provided patent protection before they have 
been required to.387 Therefore in order for LDCs to make use of the extended 
transitional period regarding pharmaceutical patents, they will have to make the 
necessary changes to their national laws to incorporate the exemption for 
pharmaceuticals.388 
In its roll-out programme exclusively based on Cipla’s HIV/AIDS drug Triomune (a 
fixed-dose combination) imported from India, Malawi realized that the drug would 
infringe patents valid in Malawi.389 Malawi reportedly sought the assistance of an 
international legal consultant which resulted in a letter issued by the Government 
of Malawi, wherein   Malawi invoked Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration in its 
request to UNICEF for the procurement of generic versions of an attached list of 
                                                 
384 Chapter 49:02 of the Laws of Malawi 
385 Lewis- Lettington, Banda, “A survey of policy and practice on the use of access to medicines-
related TRIPS flexibilities in Malawi” (2004) 17 DFID HRSC Issue Paper. Available online at 
http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/atm/Lettington.pdf  (accessed on 05/10/08).  
386 Section 30 of Malawi’s Patents Act. 
387 Thorpe fn 76. 
388 Masungu, Oh (fn 4) 14.  
389 Lettington (385) 38. 
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pharmaceutical products.390 However this letter reflects a fundamental 
misconception of the meaning of Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration.391 
However some doubt exists as to how countries may proceed to deal with 
pharmaceutical patents already granted, as the Decision extending the transitional 
period for LDCs does not seem to terminate existing patent holders’ rights under 
domestic law.392 Suggestions have been made an LDC declare its intention to 
suspend patent protection pursuant to the Decision however there is a real risk of a 
claim from a patent holder unless the national law on suspension or non-voluntary 
has been properly adhered to.393  
It is submitted that LDCs will do well to take full advantage of this flexibility and 
refrain from granting pharmaceutical patents.  
4.13 The Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement   
Paragraph 11 of the 30 August Decision envisioned a permanent solution of article 
31(f), wherein the TRIPS Council was tasked with initiating work for the 
amendment of the TRIPS Agreement by the end of 2003 with a view to the 
amendment’s adoption by the end of six months.394  
                                                 
390 Lettington (385) 39. 
A relevant excerpt of the letter provides as follows; 
“Malawi invokes Paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health to request 
UNICEF to procure generic versions of the attached pharmaceutical products, diagnostic kits and 
related medical supplies. Malawi notes that footnote 6 of Paragraph 2 (a) (iii) of the 3o August 
Decision of the General Council of the WTO on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health provides that the subparagraph is without prejudice to 
article 66(1) of TRIPS. Article 66(1) of TRIPS provides that Malawi and other least-developed 
countries have a transitional period of 10 years to comply with TRIPS, which had been extended to 
2016. This means that Malawi is not currently required to grant a compulsory licence in relation to 
any products which may be subject to patent within its territory. As required, Malawi will notify the 
WTO TRIPS Council of the attached list.” 
391 Lettington (fn 385) 39. 
The misconception is that Paragraph 7 extends Malawi’s general TRIPS implementation until 2016, 
which is a gross error because Paragraph 7 extends obligations solely with regard pharmaceutical 
patents.  
392 Masungu (fn 4) 14. 
393 Masungu (fn 4)  15.  
394 The second part of Paragraph 11 states that “ The TRIPS Council shall initiate by the end of 2003 
work on the preparation of such an amendment with a view to its adoption within six months, on 
the understanding that the amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this Decision and on 
the further understanding that it will not be part of the negotiations referred in paragraph 45  of the 
Doha Ministerial Declaration”     
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Given the divergent interests of Members, the time deadline laid out in paragraph 
11 could not be met. There were disagreements between Members as to the form of 
the Amendment, with some Members suggesting that it takes the form of a 
footnote to article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.395 Members opposed to the foot 
note proposal regarded this suggestion as an attempt to downplay the significance 
of the Decision and upgrading of the Chairperson’s Statement, they therefore 
argued for a full incorporation in the TRIPS Agreement.396   
Finally consensus was reached on 6 December 2005 when the General Council 
adopted the Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement making 
permanent the 3o August Decision, barely a week before the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Conference.397  
 
4.13.1 Article 31 bis 
The amendment which will insert a new article, namely article 31 bis, designed to 
mirror the 2003 waiver as closely as possible comprises of 5 paragraphs under 
article 31 bis (i.e. an additional article after article 31). 398  
 
The first paragraph permits the export to countries lacking the sufficient 
manufacturing capacity of pharmaceutical generic-version products manufactured 
under compulsory licences. The second paragraph deals with article 31(h) waiver, 
the flexibility granted to regional trade agreements involving developing countries 
and LDCs is dealt with in paragraph 3. The issue of “non-violation” is addressed in 
paragraph 4, which provides that Members may not use article XXIII of GATT 
                                                 
395 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 273. 
396 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 273. 
397 WT/L/641 Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement adopted by the General 
Council, 6 December 2005. Available online at . The Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement came 
a week after Members adopted the Decision to extend the transitional period for LDCs in complying 
with their TRIPS obligations. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm  
accessed on 19/02/09 
398  “Members ok amendment to make health flexibility permanent”, 6 December 2005. At this time 
Norway, Canada and India had informed the WTO that their laws implementing the waiver are 
complete, while the Republic of Korea and the EU intimated that their new laws were on the verge 
of coming into force. Available online at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm accessed on 10/02/09.       
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1994 to challenge measures taken in terms of article 31 bis.399 Paragraph 5 retains 
all existing flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
 A new annex to the TRIPS Agreement, which also contains the same provisions as 
the 30 August Decision,  adds a further 7 paragraphs  setting out the terms for 
using the system, definitions, notifications, measures to prevent diversion of 
pharmaceutical products into the wrong markets, developing regional systems to 
allow economies of scale and annual reviews in the TRIPS Council. An “appendix” 
to this annex addresses with assessing lack of manufacturing capacity in the 
importing country, this was originally an annex to the 2003 Decision. The new 
article 31 “bis” and annex of the TRIPS Agreement are attached to a Protocol of 
Amendment. This was then attached to a General Council Decision adopting the 
Protocol and opening it for members to accept it by 1 December 2007.    
 
4.13.2 Article X Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO 
Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement in article X deals with the issue of amending 
of the multilateral trade agreements.400 Article X (3) deals with the procedure 
relating to the coming into force of amendments.401 
 
From these provisions the amendment will only come into force upon acceptance 
by a two thirds majority of the WTO’s Membership. Once the two thirds majority 
has formally accepted it, the amendment will become effective on those Members 
and will replace the 2003 waiver for these countries. For each of the remaining 
Members the waiver will continue to apply until that member accepts the 
amendment and it takes effect. To date only twenty one Members have accepted 
                                                 
399 Fn 231. 
400 Article X titled “amendments” , in paragraph 1 it deals with issues at to the procedure of 
amending any of the multilateral trade agreements, how proposals to amend are to be tabled among 
other things. 
401 Paragraph 3 provides that “amendments to the multilateral trade agreements of a nature that 
would alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members that have 
accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and thereafter for each Member upon 
acceptance by it.”  
 
 
 
 
 99
the amendment the first acceptance was by the Unites States on 17 December 2005 
with the latest acceptance being made on 26 January 2009 by Albania.402   
 
At a glance of Members who have accepted the amendment, the absence of African 
countries is conspicuous. The question which then begs an answer is why this is so 
particularly in light of the fact that the Doha Declaration was adopted at the 
prompting of the Africa Group and other developing Member countries. It is the 
Declaration which ultimately led to the adoption of the 30 August Decision and 
later the Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement. 
One would therefore naturally expect developing countries and LDCs to exhibit 
some enthusiasm by accepting the amendment. This has obviously not been so and 
this could be pointing to the ineffectiveness of the system, the unwieldy and 
cumbersome processed involved which has made these countries reluctant to adopt 
the amendment. This should be an indication to the WTO itself that the step to 
make permanent the waiver was not the best option as the waiver itself is flawed. 
 
Members of the WTO had originally set 1 December 2007 as the deadline for 
acceptance of the amendment.403 This deadline was not met because by 1 
December 2007 only 14 countries had accepted the amendment. In 2008 the 
deadline was further extended by the Decision to extend deadline to 31 December 
2009 for accepting TRIPS Agreement amendment with the possibility of a further 
extension if the deadline is not met.404  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
402List available online at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm 
(accessed on 15/04/09). 
403 Paragraph 2 of the Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that “the Protocol shall be 
open for acceptance by Members until 1 December 2007 or such later date as may be decided by the 
Ministerial Conference.”     
404 WT/L/711 “Decision to extend deadline for accepting TRIPS Agreement amendment” wherein 
Members agreed that the period for acceptance by Members of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS 
Agreement “shall be extended until 31 December 2009 or such later date as may be decided by the 
Ministerial Conference.”    
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4.13.3 The General Council Chairperson’s Statement 
It must be noted that Members had to agree on the text of the Chairperson’s 
Statement that was to be delivered before the adoption of the Decision amending 
the TRIPS Agreement by the Council.405 
 
The Statement made by the Chairperson prior to the Decision amending the TRIPS 
Agreement mirrors the Chairperson’s Statement delivered at the adoption of the 30 
August Decision.406 A unique feature of the 2005 Statement is that it makes 
reference to non-violation complaints and stipulates that “paragraph 4 of article 31 
bis in the proposed amendment is not with prejudice to overall question of the 
applicability of sub-paragraphs 1(b) and 1(c) of article XXIII of GATT 1994.” 407 
As already discussed earlier there is lack of agreement as to the status of the 
Chairperson’s Statement.408    
 
The decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement drew mixed reactions from 
stakeholders in the sphere of access to medicines. In a WTO press release the 
Director General Pascal Lamy applauded the this amendment as “confirming once 
again that Members are determined to ensure the WTO’s trading system 
contributes to humanitarian and development goals.”409 
 
In addition the Decision means that for the first time in the history of the 
international trade body a core WTO trade agreement will be amended.  
 
4.13.4 Reactions to the Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement 
At a press conference soon after the adoption of the decision the General Council 
Chairperson was quoted as saying that the decision to amend the TRIPS 
                                                 
405 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 274. 
406 Fn 235. 
407 Fn 231. 
408 Fn 235. 
409Press/ 426 “Members ok amendment to make health flexibility permanent”, 6 December 2005. 
Available online at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr426_e.htm (accessed on 
10/02/09).      
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Agreement was “extremely important”, that “gives the WTO a very human face”.410  
The Chairperson further said that the waiver “had delivered”, although at that time 
it had not been used by any country, its success could not be judged by the 
frequency of its use, as just the fact that the system was in place could bring 
comfort, therefore it is not flawed just because it had not been used. According to 
the Chairperson the waiver had done just what it had set out to do, namely address 
the public health issue and crisis in poor countries and it had also worked to lower 
prices on medicines for diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The General Council’s Chair 
attributed the non-use of the mechanism to the fact that it took time for countries 
to implement necessary changes in domestic laws and that up to that time it had 
been possible to import cheap medicines or active substances from India which 
only introduced patent protection for pharmaceuticals in that year in 2005, and in 
light of this there was greater likelihood that countries would now make use of the 
waiver. 
 
In a press release dated 6 December 2005 MSF411 “expressed alarm” at the WTO’s 
Decision to make permanent the waiver of article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. 
The NGO drew attention to the fact that at that time no single drug had been 
manufactured and exported in terms of the Decision. Moreover the far better 
option would have been to delay the amendment giving the opportunity to test and 
improving the system in practice. MSF was also quoted pointing out  the fact that 
“the amendment does not allow for the procurement medicines through 
international tendering, which is the most common and efficient way of purchasing 
drugs” and the decision reflected that the international trade body was “ignoring 
the day-to-day reality of production and procurement”.412  
 
 
 
                                                 
410 Fn 244. 
411“Amendment of the WTO TRIPS Agreement makes access to affordable medicines even more 
bleak”, 6 December 2005. Available online at  
http://doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=1640 (accessed on 08/04/09). 
412Fn 244.  
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4.14 Have the Doha Declaration and 30 August Decision delivered? 
It can be said that the Doha Declaration has had some measure of success 
particularly with the regard to the use of compulsory licences. It has been shown 
that there has been an increase of compulsory licences issued after the Doha 
Declaration in fact it has been the most widely used mechanism among developing 
countries and the result has been achieved where used. However in light of the fact 
that a third of the world’s population still lacks access to essential medicines (with 
this figure concentrated in Asia and Africa), it is submitted that the issue of access 
to medication is still far from being achieved.413 
 
It must be noted that the use of compulsory licensing should not over-shadow 
other flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement. In this regard India’s Amendment in 
2005 is a noteworthy case in point wherein the other flexibilities such as bolar 
exception and exclusions from patentability have been incorporated into domestic 
legislation. This however has still been met with resistance by the pharmaceutical 
industry as well as some developed countries. 
 
After the Doha Declaration’s adoption, countries implementing the flexibilities 
have expressly relied on the Declaration’s spirit, purport and provisions. It is 
submitted that in this regard the Declaration has achieved its purpose in terms of 
providing legal backing to substantiate developing countries’ implementation. 
Therefore it will be difficult for industrialized countries to challenge these actions if 
they are TRIPS compliant and are based on the Declaration.   
 
Indeed the Doha Declaration has been cited as on of the major causes  for the 
decline on prices for ARVs.414 With regard to the 30 August Decision it has been 
although it is by no means the panacea to the prevalent HIV/AIDS pandemic and a 
host of other public health problems facing developing countries, it does however 
                                                 
413 Kerry (fn 34) 2.  
414 Avafia “TRIPS and public health: the unresolved debate” Tralac Trade brief (2005) 3. 
Others examples cited include the law suit brought by the pharmaceutical industry against the 
President of the Republic of South Africa, Brazil’s threats to issue compulsory licences, donations of 
ARVs by pharmaceutical companies, as well as the massive lobbying by NGO groups.  
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constitute a helpful piece of a much larger public health puzzle.415 Indeed the Doha 
Declaration recognizes in Paragraph 2 that the TRIPS Agreement is part of the 
wider national and international action to address these problems. 
 
The thesis has shown clearly that the issue of access to essential medicines is not 
confined to HIV/AIDS as the anthrax episode in USA and Canada, Thailand’s 
Plavix compulsory licence have all demonstrated. Ultimately the issue of what 
medicine can be classified as “essential” within a particular is entirely a matter to 
be determined by a country taking into account its unique needs.416 
 
The lack of appropriate legislation in many developing countries to incorporate 
under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration has remained a key 
challenge.417 This is significant because the TRIPS flexibilities are not self-
executing, they require legislative implementation. Although some developing 
countries have enacted legislation to take advantage of some of the flexibilities, 
there are significant legislative and administrative obstacles confronting the 
introduction and implementation of the flexibilities.418 In addition IP protection in 
many developing countries and LDCs is “TRIPS-plus”, that is, often stronger than 
the minimum required by the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
The utilization of the flexibilities can indeed promote access to medicines in 
developing countries.419 Their implementation has seen an increased number of 
people accessing the medication as well as well as the significant price reductions 
of the drugs either through generic versions entering the market or the patent 
holders reducing the prices.  
 
                                                 
415 Abbott (fn 51) 318. 
416 Fn 3. 
417 Kerry (fn 34) 5.  
418  “Access to medicines in under-served markets: What are the implications of changes in 
intellectual property rights, trade and drug registration policy.” (2004) A DFID HRSC Overview 
Paper (drawing on seven studies) Commissioned by DFID UK 6. Available online at 
http://www.dfidhealthrc.org/publications/atm/DFID_synthesis_aw.pdf ( accessed on 04/10/08)  
419 Musungu (fn 4) xii. 
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On a more positive note Thailand must be commended for making use of 
compulsory licensing in order to address the public health concerns of its citizens, 
and ensure universal access to medicines pursuant to its National Health Security 
Act. It is regrettable that Thailand’s exercise of the legitimate flexibility, once again, 
has been met with stiff opposition from the pharmaceutical industry as well as the 
USA administration as evidenced by the placing of Thailand on the USA’s Special 
301 Watch List. The actions by the USA and the pharmaceutical industry are in 
stark contradiction with the Doha Declaration which stipulates in Paragraph 4 that 
the TRIPS Agreement “can and should be interpreted” in a way that supports 
“Members’ right to protect public health and in particular to promote access to 
medicines for all”. 
 
It has been suggested that these reactions by the industry could possibly be one of 
the reasons deterring Members from fully utilizing the flexibilities.420 The actions 
by Thailand should actually serve as motivation for other developing countries, 
because none of the pharmaceutical companies have taken the matter to the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Body because it based on the Doha Declaration. This should be 
taken as an indication that even the WTO will not find in favor of the industry 
provided that such flexibilities are implemented in a TRIPS-compliant manner. 
The inclusion of Thailand by the USTR on the Special 301 Watch List leaves a lot to 
be desired. Despite the USA’s assurances that it is committed to the Doha 
Declaration its actions and those of the pharmaceutical industry reverse the gains 
developing countries made by the adoption of the Doha Declaration.  
 
With regard to the issue that the Decision has only seen one drug being imported 
under the system it has been suggested that the reason could be that many of the 
first line ARVs are “pre-TRIPS”, meaning that they are not patented in India and 
therefore generic versions are still available.421 However as pharmaceutical product 
patents have to be granted in al countries (except in LDCs) it is hoped that the 
system will be used more often. 
                                                 
420 Hestermeyer (fn 295). 
421 Hoen (fn 221) 37. 
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The 30 August Decision’s widely noted cumbersome administrative procedures, 
the fear by developing countries that using the system might attract economic 
sanctions, inter alia, were confirmed by the amendments to Canada’s Patent Act. In 
2006 CIPIH made recommendations that the system be kept under review taking 
into account changes that might be needed to make the system more effective.422 
On this point it is important to note that paragraph 8 of the 30 August Decision 
requires annual reviews of the Decision by the TRIPS Council with the annual 
reports to the General Council. It is submitted that if there is constant usage of the 
system, it might serve to highlight even more its flaws which might provide 
impetus for its review. 
 
There is certainly hope that if developing countries are able to overcome the 
attendant administrative burdens in the 30 August Decision, there may be  long 
term benefits realised regarding access to medicines.423 
 
4.14.1 Dutch episode 
The confiscation of a consignment of drugs by the Dutch customs en route to Brazil 
from India in December 2008 sparked indignation among developing countries 
and put the issue of access to medicines back on WTO’s agenda.424In response 
India and Brazil reportedly raised the issue first with the General Council on the 
basis that such action could not be reconciled with the Doha Declaration’s terms. 
When Brazil raised the issue with the TRIPS Council it is reported to have revealed 
that based on its investigations there was evidence to suggest that the losartan 
incident was neither isolated nor exceptional as its investigations showed that such 
similar incidents had occurred. The incident was also described as one of the most 
                                                 
422 Hoen (fn 221) 37 . 
423 Matthews, “History repeating itself? The outcome of negotiations on access to medicines, the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and intellectual property rights in the World Trade Organization” (2004) 1 
Law, Social Justice and Global Development Journal 12. 
424 “Access to medicines back on centre stage at the WTO, Bridges” Weekly News Update (March 
2009)  13. Available online at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/44203/ (accessed on 30/03/09). 
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troubling post Doha Declaration actions affecting the public health interests of 
developing countries.425 
 
It is apparent that such actions my some developed countries are not assisting the 
realisation of the spirit and purpose of the Doha Declaration. 
 
4.14.2 The research and development gap 
The issue of access to essential medicines is closely linked to R & D issues. In the 
first place for one to talk about access to essential medicines, the medicines 
themselves must be available. The reality is that if the medicines are not available 
then there can never be access, in other words, access to essential medicines is 
dependant on the availability of the drugs which is naturally determined by the 
funding invested into R &D for the diseases.  
 
It is regrettable that the Doha Declaration and the Paragraph 6 Decision do not 
address the pivotal issue of underinvestment in R &D for health conditions that 
principally affect developing countries.426 Statistics have indicated that the global 
spending on health research is skewered towards the world’s wealthy markets, with 
90 percent of the spending directed at health problems of less than 10 percent of 
the world’s population, commonly referred to as the 10/90 gap.427  Medical 
innovation is directed towards drugs that give commercial needs, not the greatest 
therapeutic benefits, while diseases that take the heaviest toll among the world’s 
poor do not attract much in the way of investment into R& D and therefore remain 
grossly insufficient.428 
 
                                                 
425 Abbott, “Worst fears realised: the Dutch confiscation of medicines bound from India to Brazil” 
Bridges Weekly News Update 13 (March 2009). Available online at 
http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/44192/ ( accessed on 30/03/09). 
 
426 Kerry (fn 34) 4.  
427 Kerry (fn 34) 5. 
428 “What is wrong with R& D today?” MSF Publications. Available on line at   
http://www.msfaccess.org/main/medical-innovation/introduction-to-medical-innovation/what-is-
wrong-with-r-d-today/    accessed on 12/04/09. 
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A study revealed that in addition to the research gap, there appears to be an even 
greater medical information gap between the world’s rich and poor countries, with 
diseases ravaging poor countries being significantly under reported.429 
 
The Report by the CIPIH  
Fortunately the WHO addressed the issue of R& D. In April 2006 the WHO 
Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (CIPIH) 
released a report wherein it concluded that the problems of access to medicines 
and medical innovation had to be addressed together and that addressing this 
nexus is important if the problem is to be solved.430 The Report highlighted the fact 
that even though new products may be developed, such innovation is of has no 
value if the medicine cannot be made available and accessible to those in need.431   
 
The Report also noted, with concern, that current government policies including 
incentive and funding mechanisms, both in developed and developing countries 
have not generated sufficient innovation relevant to the needs of most developing 
countries.432 Numerous well considered recommendations were then proffered 
among them were: governments of developed countries should devote a growing 
proportion of their total health R&D funding to the health needs of the developing 
world. Developing countries were also advised to establish, implement and 
strengthen national programmes for health research, with appropriate political 
support and long term funding.433  
 
                                                 
429 Lown, The developing world and The New England Journal of Medicine (2006) 2 Globalization 
and Health 1. Available online at http://www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/2/1/3  (accessed 
14/04/09). 
The study examined 416 weekly issues of the New England Journal of Medicines over an 8 year 
period between January 1997 and December 2004. It revealed that less than 3 percent of these 
publications dealt with health issues specific to the developing world. With regard to other medical 
publications, the study showed that 8 industrialised countries accounted for close to 85 percent of 
scientific articles, while 163 low- income countries only contributed a paltry 2,5 per cent. 
430 “Public Health,  Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights- Report of the Commission on 
Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health”. Available online at 
http://www.msfaccess.org/fileadmin/user_upload/medinnov_accesspatents/CIPIH%20report.pdf 
(accessed on 03/05/09). 
431 (Fn430) 97. 
432 (Fn 430) 172. 
433 (Fn 430) 175. 
 
 
 
 
 108
Subsequent to the CIPIH’s recommendations the Intergovernmental Working 
Group for Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IGWG) was 
established to examine ways to encourage innovation while improving access.434 In 
negotiation sessions of the IGWG , Ministers of Health and WHO were tasked with 
formulating a strategy and plan of action to address the twin problems of access to 
medicines and the lack of R & D into diseases mostly affecting the poor. Although 
governments agreed on a decision to pursue discussions on an essential health and 
biomedical R & D treaty, minimal progress was made with regard to IP issues and 
these remain contested.435   
 
The proposed R &D treaty is based on recommendations made by Hubbard and 
Love, who propose a trade framework with emphasis on equitable contribution to 
the cost of R& D through various avenues and not solely through the granting of 
patent rights.436 
 
It is submitted that these noble efforts made by CIPIH AND IGWG need to 
matched with political will by governments in order for the recommendations to be 
effected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
434 “Reshaping a new R & D agenda”,  MSF Publications. Available online at   
http://www.msfaccess.org/main/medical-innovation/introduction-to-medical-
innovation/shaping-a-new-r-d-agenda/ (accessed on 03/05/09). 
435 “IGWG negotiations progress- UN health talks make progress on R & D, but run out of time” 
MSF Publications. Available online at http://www.msfaccess.org/main/medical-innovation/igwg-
negotiations-progress/ accessed on 03/05/09 
436 Hoen (fn 221) 97.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
                          Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The tensions that exist between developing countries, on the one hand, and 
developed countries on the other hand in issues of access to essential medicines are 
nothing new. They are simply a replication of the same differences that at existed at 
the time when the TRIPS Agreement was being negotiated up until it was finally 
adopted in 1994. 
  
The flexibilities, the Doha Declaration and the 30 August Decision represent a 
middle ground between the competing interests. In light of the foregoing 
discussion it can be said that although there have been successes by some countries 
in implementing the flexibilities; there has been the same resistance that 
developing countries have always faced from the pharmaceutical industry and 
developed Members in the pre-Doha era.  
 
While the Doha Declaration as well as the subsequent 30 August Decision cannot 
be described as absolute successes, they do however represent a commendable step 
forward in addressing the realities that exist among the world’s poor. However 
there is a lack however of political commitment by industrialized countries in 
respecting these decisions taken in the multilateral trading system. Therefore there 
is still a long way to go in ensuring that access to medicines for all is achieved.  
 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
It is recommended that developing countries make full use of the full range of 
flexibilities where they have not done so; an example in this regard is India’s 2005 
Amendment, in order to address their public health concerns by making available 
lower priced medicines. It has been suggested that implementing this policy space 
by developing countries does not prejudice the interest of developed Members or 
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the pharmaceutical industry because the industry is not significantly dependant on 
profits from developing countries.437 
 
With regard to LDCs it is a considered recommendation that they must take full 
advantage of the 2002 Decision extending the transition period for LDCs regarding 
their pharmaceutical obligations, wherein they are not obliged to grant 
pharmaceutical patents until 2016. It is suggested that where LDCs have granted 
pharmaceutical patents, they are allowed to “roll back” on these patents and use 
their transition as article 65(1) does not apply to article 66 (1).438  
 
Developed Member countries should incorporate in their domestic laws, the 
provisions of the 30 August Decision whose main advantage is that it enables the 
production of pharmaceutical products wholly for export to members lacking 
manufacturing capacity.439 Other developed Members can take a leaf from 
Canada’s Patent Act, for example, on the issue of “adequate remuneration”, as well 
as “reasonable” time before a compulsory licence can be granted. However, the 
other features of Canada’s regime, such as the limited list of products, must be 
avoided at all costs. Developed country governments must bear in mind that 
incorporating the 3o August Decision’s provisions into their domestic laws is not 
just a matter of mere convenience or political choice but that the Decision has 
created international obligations that must be complied with in good faith.440 
 
Paragraph 3 of the proposed article 31 bis whose purpose it harness economies of 
scale with the aim of enhancing purchasing power for and facilitating, the local 
production of pharmaceutical products. It allows for the re-exportation of products 
under the system to another Member without issuing another licence within the 
same regional configuration provided that more than half of the Members are 
designated as LDCs by the United Nations. This flexibility was included with 
African countries in mind.  
                                                 
437 Abbott (fn 59) 6.  
438 Hestermeyer (fn 53) 73  
439 Mmeta (fn 245) 8.  
440 Correa(fn 230) 8.   
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The criticism levelled against cumbersome procedures in the 3o August Decision as 
well as the 2005 Decision to amend the TRIPS Agreement is deserved. Indeed 
these two instruments do not represent the most advantageous remedy for those 
seeking a simple and expeditious mechanism allowing the issuance of compulsory 
licences.441 However, what must be borne in mind these instruments are the 
product of a long and protracted negotiating process involving very divergent views 
with regards to an “optimal solution”.442 With that in mind these two instruments 
represent a formal lowering of IP protection,443 which must be taken advantage of. 
Since the 30 August Decision has only been used once by Rwanda, there is a lack of 
substantial empirical evidence to support either recommending acceptance of the 
Amendment or declining acceptance.444 It has been suggested that seeking an 
“improved deal” is not possible in the prevailing global political climate; however, 
the Amendment has the potential to bring net gains to the public health sector.445 
These and other considerations must inform the choice to either accept or reject 
the Amendment.  
  
Countries must boldly use the full range of the flexibilities in order to satisfy their 
public health needs. In light of the preceding discussion it is a considered 
recommendation that developing countries make efforts to use the 30 August 
Decision in order to address their public health needs.  Even though the Decision is 
still an interim solution, the granting of licences and waivers under the Decision 
will not be challenged, in all probability, if implemented in compliance with the 
Decision.446 Furthermore, as already discussed paragraph 10 of the Decision 
actions taken under its provisions will not be the subject to dispute settlement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
441 Abbott(fn 39) 932.  
442 Abbott(fn 39) 933. 
443 Abbott (fn 39) 933. 
444 Abbott (fn 39)933. 
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